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Abstract 
A critical role of the internal auditor is to design and monitor their organization's 
system of internal controls (COSO, 2004).  In addition, they may be expected to objectively 
assess the quality of internal controls as professional auditors (Gray, 2004).   External 
auditors have expressed concern that an internal auditor’s strong identity with their 
organization will bias any internal control assessments he or she makes of that organization 
(Schneider, 1984). Even so, accounting regulators believe internal auditors’ internal control 
assessments can be objective, and also maintain that having external auditors rely on these 
assessments should help to lower audit fees without jeopardizing audit quality (AICPA, 1990 
- AS 5).  Through two separate experiments, relying on social identity theory, social norms 
and the organizational silence literature in psychology, I examine whether the “employee” 
identity the internal auditor assumes as a member of the organization encourages other 
employees to share more information about internal control weaknesses with the internal 
auditor than the external auditor.   In addition, I explore conditions under which the external 
auditor may be willing to rely on the internal auditor’s internal control assessment even if the 
internal auditor’s organizational identity is strong.  Overall, this research will help external 
auditors, managers and regulators understand conditions under which the internal auditor can 
maintain their objectivity when performing an internal control assessment. Specifically, this 
research examines the potential importance of cueing internal auditors through the use of a 
strong code of ethics, such as the code of ethics enacted by the Institute of Internal Auditors, 
to the maintenance of the objectivity of all internal auditors.  If the internal audit work is 
objective enough to be relied upon by the external auditor, the client can benefit from an 
audit of high quality while at the same time potentially lowering overall audit fees.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 Since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), internal auditors 
(hereafter, the IA) have been required, more than ever, to take on dual roles within their 
organizations (Roth, 2002).  On one hand, they are expected to be an independent auditor and 
maintain their professional auditor identity by acting as the internal ‘watch dog’ for the 
organization.1  In this role they are expected to be independent and objective in their 
assessments of the firm’s systems of internal controls, allowing external auditors (hereafter, 
the EA) to rely on their work (SAS 65).  On the other hand, IAs are also expected to maintain 
an employee identity by acting as the ‘trusted insider’ who advises and consults with 
management of the organization  to  improve the organization’s system of internal controls.  
The question then arises whether these dual identities improve or detract from the IA’s overall 
evaluation of the firm’s system of internal control.  Can the IA work closely with others 
within the organization when discussing internal controls (i.e., invoke their employee 
identity), but then switch to their more objective auditor identity, when the situation requires? 
The Institute of Internal Auditors (hereafter, the IIA) believes the IA’s role as an 
organizational insider allows the IA to have a stronger understanding of the organization’s 
                                                     
1 Throughout this thesis I use Akerlof and Kranton’s (2010) simplified definition of identity, “…identity defines 
who they are - their social category.”  This identity will then influence an individual’s decision making because 
each social category will have different social norms associated with it.  Specifically, professional identity is 
considered a group identity, which is formed through the affiliation with a specific group.  The group will have 
certain social norms that all members are expected to adhere to in order to be a member (King, 2002; Akerlof 
and Kranton, 2010).  Employee identity will be formed similarly but with reference to work group affiliations 
within the organization. 
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internal controls and helps to ensure the identification of any control system weaknesses 
(Chadwick, 2000; Fitzpatrick, 2001).  Critics argue that the relationships the IA develops 
within the organization will affect their objectivity when asked to assess the organization’s 
internal controls. The objective of the current study is to ask whether it is possible for both 
points of view to be correct, at least to some degree, and further, whether IAs can actually use 
these dual identities to their advantage.2   
This research project examines the following two research questions.  First, does the 
“employee” identity IAs assume within the organization allow them the opportunity to 
discover more internal control weaknesses than would an external auditor?  Particularly, will 
employees share more information about internal control weaknesses with the IA than the 
EA?  Second, once the IA has obtained the internal control weaknesses, can the IA readily 
move from one identity to the other (i.e., from the organizational insider to the professional 
auditor) and assess the internal control information objectively?  Particularly, will the IA be 
able to objectively assess internal control weaknesses so that the EA can be confident in 
relying on the IA’s work?  These two questions are intertwined in that if the IA cannot 
objectively assess the internal control information obtained from employees, then any benefit 
gained from being an organizational insider is lost.  Therefore, to fully understand the benefits 
and limitations of the IA’s role in the evaluating the firm’s system of internal controls, one 
must answer both questions. 
                                                     
2 Both viewpoints can be somewhat correct as the IA may be able to obtain internal control weaknesses, but then 
may be biased in assessing these same weaknesses. 
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Certain strands of prior research suggest the IA may have an advantage over the EA in 
collecting information about internal control weaknesses. First, according to social identity 
theory (hereafter, SIT), in-group members trust other in-group members more than they trust 
out-group members (Ashforth et al., 2008). Research relying on SIT has also shown that 
individuals will share more information with their in-group than with their out-group 
(Ashforth et al., 2008).  The connection the IA has with the organization should allow the IA 
to become part of the organizational in-group.  Therefore, the IA in his/her role as a trusted 
internal advisor is likely to obtain higher in-group status with other employees than will the 
EA. If this in-group status is salient to employees during the IA’s internal control interview 
process, then it is likely employees will share more information about the internal control 
system and its workings with the IA than they would share with the EA. Therefore, it is 
possible that the IA will not only obtain more information from employees concerning the 
firm’s system of internal controls, but also potentially more information about control system 
weaknesses than would an organizational outsider such as the external auditor.   
The severity of the identified control weaknesses will also impact how much will be 
shared.  Research in “organizational silence” indicates that employees are more willing to 
share negative information within their organization than outside of it (Tangirala and 
Ramanujam, 2008; Van Dyne et al., 2003).3 Three types of silence can be invoked; 
acquiescent (i.e., assuming one’s information will be ignored), defensive (i.e., protecting 
oneself), and pro-social (i.e., protecting the organization). According to theory, sharing 
                                                     
3 Organizational silence is defined by Van Dyne et al. (2003) as the intentional withholding of relevant 
information, opinions or ideas within an organization, by one of the organization’s employees.   
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negative information outside of the organization (e.g., with EAs) will invoke both defensive 
and pro-social silence, whereas sharing information inside the organization (i.e., with the IA) 
will invoke defensive silence alone. When perceived severity of control system weaknesses is 
low, it is unlikely that silence of any type will be invoked regardless of whether the 
information is required by those inside or outside of the organization, which is expected based 
on research by Kish-Gephart et al. (2009). As the degree of perceived severity of control 
system weaknesses increases, both pro-social and defensive silence may be invoked when 
asked to share it with outsiders while only defensive silence may be invoked when asked to 
share with insiders; therefore, I expect employees will share relatively more information about 
control system weaknesses within the organization (i.e., with the IA) than outside the 
organization (i.e., with the EA) as its perceived severity increases. 
 Although gaining more information is a benefit of the IA’s in-group status, there is 
also a potential cost of in-group status in terms of IA objectivity. Several prior studies have 
demonstrated the IA may lack objectivity when evaluating estimates and opinions of 
management (Ahlawat and Lowe, 2004; Glover et al., 2008; Bedard and Graham, 2011) due 
to their relationship with their organization.  To attenuate any bias emanating from the IA’s 
in-group status, the IA needs to be able to switch identities, from “insider” to objective 
“auditor”, when assessing the obtained information.   Previous work has shown that members 
of the IIA have been able to resist threats to their objectivity when their IIA membership 
status is made salient to them (Harrell et al., 1989).  Therefore, increasing the salience of the 
IA’s professional norms (including the norm of objectivity), by reminding the IA of the IIA 
code of ethics before they assess the evidence collected concerning internal control 
                                                                            5 
weaknesses identified by employees in their organization, should allow them to provide a 
more objective assessment.  
 I examine these ideas through two separate experiments.  The first experiment 
examines whether the IA can actually obtain more negative information about internal control 
system weaknesses from employees than can an EA as predicted by SIT and the 
organizational silence literature.  To investigate this question, I manipulate interviewer type 
(IA/EA) between-subjects and internal control weakness severity (high/low) within subjects.4
 Participants are 85 employees with experience dealing with internal controls, recruited 
through the Amazon Mechanical Turk task system.5   The dependent variable is participants’ 
willingness to share four specified internal control weaknesses that they are informed have 
occurred within their organization.  Based on social identity theory and the organizational 
silence literature, I predict that overall, participants will share more information with the IA 
than the EA.  This effect will be magnified by the severity of the internal control weakness. 
The second experiment investigates the degree to which cueing the IA's professional norms 
with the IIA code of ethics helps the IA to remain objective when assessing the organization’s 
internal control weaknesses.  In this experiment, I manipulate two factors between subjects; 
organizational identity strength, which is defined as the strength of perception of belonging to 
                                                     
4 These weaknesses are identified as high and low in severity based on pilot testing with senior auditing students 
who have had on average 5 months of experience in public practice.  Similar results were found in a later pretest 
in which participants were drawn from the same participant pool as used in hypothesis testing. 
5 Started in 2005, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT) is an internet labor market, which allows requesters to pay 
individuals to complete Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs). Recently, AMT has become a popular source of 
experimental data for social scientists due to the large and easily accessible participant pool, which has been 
shown to be more diverse than traditional participant pools (Paolacci et al., 2010).  Furthermore, studies run on 
AMT have been able to consistently replicate prior decision making findings where participants were drawn 
from more traditional participant pools (e.g. undergraduate and graduate students) (Paolacci, et al. 2010; Horton 
et al., 2010; Farrell et al. 2014).   
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an organization (Mael and Ashforth, 1992) and professional norm salience, defined as the 
prominence in the IA’s judgment process of information about the expectations of the 
professional group to which they belong.  Participants include 83 IAs and 34 EAs. Internal 
control assessments are compared between IAs and EAs, given EAs are organizational 
“outsiders” who are unlikely to derive any substantial “organizational identity” from their 
association with their client.  Even so, EAs should be high on professional identity and thus 
will exhibit objectivity of the level I am trying to invoke using the IIA code of ethics with the 
IA groups. Thus EAs judgments are used as a baseline for objective control system evaluation 
against which the judgments of the IA groups will be compared.    
 Participants work through a case-based scenario in which they are asked to imagine 
they performed an internal control assessment and have reviewed a report of the results.  Half 
of the IA participants are asked to imagine they assessed internal controls within their own 
organization (strong organizational identity) and the other half are asked to imagine they 
assessed internal controls within a new sister division, XYZ, Inc., that was recently acquired 
by the IA’s organization (weak organizational identity). In addition, professional norm 
salience is manipulated by requiring half of the IAs to read and confirm adherence to a 
summary of the IIA’s code of ethics (high salience) before assessing the severity of identified 
internal control weaknesses, while the other half of IA participants will not (low salience).6  
This manipulation is similar to ones used in prior studies to operationalize social norm 
salience (Bauer, 2011; Davidson and Stevens, 2013; Mazar et al., 2008). The dependent 
                                                     
6 As professional auditors, IAs are expected to follow the IIA code of ethics, but due to being employed by an 
organization made up mainly of non-auditors, the professional code of ethics and professional internal auditing 
norms may not always be salient to them. 
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variable is a measure of the severity of the identified internal control weaknesses which are 
the same weaknesses utilized in the first experiment.   
The EA participant group reads the same case scenario except that the case refers to 
the internal control assessment of a new client, XYZ, Inc.  They are asked to assess internal 
control weaknesses within this new client's organization and their organizational identity with 
this new client will be weak (or non-existent) by design.  To better understand whether 
knowing the IA adheres to the IIA code of ethics will affect the EAs’ reliance judgment, I 
manipulate whether the EA is aware that the IA has agreed to adhere to this code of ethics or 
is unaware of this fact.  EAs in practice have expressed concern that IAs will be too attached 
to their organizations and will therefore make biased assessments of the quality of their 
organization’s system of internal controls (Desai et al., 2011).  Knowing the IA has agreed to 
adhere to the IIA professional code of ethics may increase the EA's evaluation of IA 
objectivity and consequently, their willingness to rely on the IA's work.   
 This paper contributes to existing literature in several ways.  First, Messier (2010) 
argues that recent financial scandals and resulting SOX legislation have increased the 
importance of the work of the IA in ensuring the quality of firms' financial disclosures.   
Second, most of the recent IA literature has focused on the potential for reduction of audit 
fees through the reliance of the EA on the IA’s work or on measuring the quality of the IA's 
work (Felix et al., 2001; Lawler, 1989; Prawitt et al., 2011).  These studies, while important, 
do not focus on one additional and important aspect of the IA's work, namely, the potential 
differences in pertinence of the information obtained by IAs and EAs.  Although Glover et al. 
(2008) focus on the EAs’ use of the IA’s work and Gramling et al. (2012) focus on the IA’s 
                                                                            8 
objectivity, neither one compares the quality of the information gathered by the IA and EA as 
I do in this study.  
 Third, there have recently been some conflicting views expressed in the literature on 
the degree to which the IA can remain objective.  For example, Stefaniak et al. (2012) 
demonstrate, in an experimental setting, that the IA may be less lenient than the EA in 
evaluating the severity of a particular internal control deficiency, whereas Bedard and Graham 
(2011), in an archival study, find that the IA is typically more lenient when classifying the 
severity of internal control deficiencies than the EA. My study will extend the literature in this 
area by testing whether the leniency found by Bedard and Graham (2011) can be explained by 
social identity theory and by examining ways such leniency might be mitigated.  Finally, 
previous studies of SIT in psychology have typically focused on why identity matters, but 
they have not generally looked at the consequences this identity may have on the sharing of 
negative information; therefore, it is important to explore the conditions under which 
employees will share more negative information with the internal and/or external auditors.  
 This study contributes to practice in several ways.  First, regulators who have 
promoted the idea that EAs should rely more heavily on the IA’s work through SAS 65, ISA 
610 and AS 5, would be interested to know under what conditions the IA can obtain more 
pertinent information for the internal control assessment than the EA and under what 
conditions the IA can remain objective when performing their internal control assessment.   
Also, organizations employing the IA would be able to expect their EAs to rely more heavily 
on the IA's control assessments, thus helping to their reduce audit fees.  Lastly, EAs would 
know that relying more heavily on the work of the IA could improve their audit process.  
                                                                            9 
More specifically, if the IA is competent, then the potential that additional negative 
information would be provided to the IA by employees would allow the IA to conduct a more 
accurate internal control assessment than could be performed by the EA. Therefore, if the EA 
can use the IA's work as SAS 65 recommends, the EA may feel more confident in relying on 
the IA’s internal control assessment.  
 The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.  In Chapter 2, I complete a review 
of the accounting and psychology literatures on which my predictions rely.  In Chapter 3, I 
develop my predictions in five separate hypotheses.  In Chapters 4 and 5, I describe my 
research designs and results of Study one and Study two, respectively.  In Chapter 6, I draw 
my conclusions, while discussing practical implications and limitations for the thesis as a 
whole.  
                                                                            10 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Role of the Internal Auditor 
Prior to the enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX 2002), the internal audit 
function was mainly focused on ensuring proper governance through the detection of internal 
control weaknesses within the organization (Hass et al., 2006). Their role has evolved and 
today the IA is asked to perform many different functions including risk assessments, control 
assurance and compliance, and recently they have taken on a consulting role (Roth, 2002). 
Consulting has become such an important part of the IA’s duties that the IIA has recently 
updated the definition of the IA to include consulting activities as follows: 
Internal auditing is an independent, objective assurance and consulting 
activity designed to add value and improve an organization’s operations. It 
helps an organization accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, 
disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk 
management, control, and governance process (IIA, 2011).  
 
This consulting role creates a dual identity, or two social categories, for the IA.  The first, 
professional identity, is created through their role as professional auditors, focused on 
assurance and governance of their organization through objective assessment.  In this role the 
IA is seen as a “watch dog” by management (Gray, 2004).  The second, employee identity, is 
created by their role as an “organizational consultant” or "trusted partner," working alongside 
management to improve the overall governance of the organization (Hass et al., 2006).  The 
dual roles that the IA takes on can shift daily or multiple times within one day.  At one 
moment, the IA may be asked by management to recommend how to construct a particular 
element of the internal control system, while the next moment they may be required to audit 
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the effectiveness of a similar system supervised by the same manager. 7 The IA must manage 
the different identities that these two roles create in order to ensure objectivity during the 
assessment of controls.  The interaction of these two identities could have a large negative 
effect on the overall objectivity, actual or perceived, of the IA and their work because the 
employee identity may bias the professional identity during the assessment process.  
 While creating lines of reporting where the IA reports directly to the audit committee 
supports IA independence, it may not ensure IA objectivity.  Many believe that outsourcing of 
the IA function would help to resolve objectivity issues (Glover et al., 2008), but the IIA 
strongly believes that an IA “housed internally within the organization” (IIA, 2011) is ideal.  
This is based on the assertion that in-house IAs have more day to day contact with 
organizational actors.  This contact allows more opportunities to discover problems, build 
relationships, and guide management in the appropriate direction (Chadwick, 2000; 
Fitzpatrick, 2001).  Basically, the IIA believes a strong employee identity can improve the 
IA’s work.   
 Critics of the IIA’s view argue that the close contact with the organization and the 
relationships created with management are an overall hindrance and can limit the IA’s 
objectivity.  Several prior studies have demonstrated the IA may lack objectivity when 
evaluating managements' estimates and opinions (Ahlawat and Lowe, 2004; Glover et al., 
                                                     
7 I am not implying the IA would both design and evaluate the same control.  This would be contrary to the 
International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.  I am referring to the general idea that 
the IA does design and different evaluate controls within the same organization and at times within the same 
department.  
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2008; Bedard and Graham, 2011), although Harrell et al. (1989) found that IAs who were 
members of the IIA were able to resist threats to objectivity.   
 The objectivity of the IA is important not only to the organization, but also to the 
external auditor.  The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s (PCAOB) Audit 
Standard 5 (AS5) (PCAOB, 2007) requires that external auditors make use of the IA during 
an integrated audit.  This consists of: (1) employing the direct assistance of internal auditors 
in performing audit tasks, and, (2) relying on relevant work previously completed by the IA to 
reduce the amount of additional evidence the external auditor must obtain.  Reliance on IA 
work has been found to typically lower external auditors' budgeted hours by 15 to 30 % 
(Maletta and Kida, 1993; Gramling, 1999).   
 AS 5 (PCAOB, 2007) was created to help increase the use of the IA and to reiterate 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ (AICPA) Statements on Auditing 
Standards 65 (SAS 65) (1997), which also stated EAs can rely on the IA for audit tasks and 
relevant work previously performed (AICPA, SAS 65, 1997).   Several prior studies have 
found that external auditors believe the IA has not been relied on to the fullest extent possible 
(Taylor et al., 1997; Ward and Robertson, 1980).  Even so, Felix et al. (2001) found that, 
within the Fortune 1000 firms, the IA completed approximately 27% of the financial 
statement audit work and that increasing IA involvement in the audit from 0 to 29.5% 
decreased the client’s audit fee by approximately 18%.  A recent study by Prawitt et al. (2011) 
found that these cost savings occur when the EA employs the assistance of the IA, but not 
when using previous IA work, such as internal control assessments.  EAs mainly avoid the use 
of previous IA work because SAS 65 requires the external auditor to “obtain sufficient, 
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competent, and evidential matter to support the auditor’s report” and the external auditor's 
personal knowledge “is generally more persuasive than information obtained indirectly” (pg. 
259).  This is evidence that external auditors in general may not rely on the IA's work as much 
as regulators suggest they could. 
 One area where the prior work of the IA could be particularly useful to the external 
auditor is the monitoring and evaluation of the organization’s system of internal controls.  
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) published the document “Internal 
Control – Integrated Framework” in 1992 which states that IAs play an important role in the 
monitoring of internal controls (Rezaee, 1995).  An IA’s main method to assess the 
effectiveness of the internal controls is by conducting an internal audit.   
 To conduct a quality internal audit, the IA will first evaluate the design of the internal 
controls.  This is done by reviewing the policies and procedures to ensure that adequate 
controls are in place.  Also, the IA will interview employees that are directly involved with 
the procedures to better understand the control environment and determine where weaknesses 
may exist.  Interviewing employees is very important in identifying areas where controls can 
be overwritten or procedures are not being followed.  At this point the IA will have a better 
understanding of what controls need to be tested for operating effectiveness.  Throughout this 
process, the IA has significant contact with the organization's management and employees.  
The IA may then provide recommendations to each department for future improvements to 
their internal controls.   
 Due to their extensive knowledge of the internal controls within their employing 
organization, the IA is quite often involved in the testing of controls required by SOX Section 
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404 (Gramling et al., 2004).  Again, the day to day access to systems within the organization 
and the relationships the IA is able to maintain with employees and management throughout 
the organization can be a valuable resource to the EA in this process.   
 In summary, IAs have to manage the two main identities, employee and professional, 
that may impact their overall performance within their organization.  In the next section, I 
complete a thorough literature review of the identity concept and focus on the specific 
elements of identity that relate to the IA obtaining and assessing information.  
2.2 Identity 
 Throughout this paper, I rely on Akerlof and Kranton’s (2010) simple definition of 
identity, “…identity defines who they are - their social category.” (pg. 13).  Although I rely 
on this simple definition, a more detailed explanation of identity is necessary.  First, I will 
give a brief overview of origins of the identity term within Social Identity Theory (SIT) and 
then focus on key concepts stemming from SIT such as characteristics and levels of identity, 
organizational identity, and social norms.  These are the key elements on which I rely while 
developing my hypotheses.   
 The social identity concept first appeared in a paper by Leon Festinger (1954), “A 
Theory of Social Comparison Processes”, in which the author states that “People, then, tend 
to move into groups which, in their judgment, hold opinions which agree with their own and 
whose abilities are near their own.” (pg. 136).  The term “Social Identity Theory” was not 
formally defined until the 1970s by Henri Tajfel.  Tajfel defined it as “that part of an 
individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social 
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group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that 
membership” (Tajfel, 1978).  SIT is seen as a continuum between interpersonal behavior and 
intergroup behavior, where an individual’s behavior is driven by the combination of the two 
(Tajfel, 1978). Since that time, SIT has been seen as intergroup social comparisons that seek 
to confirm or to establish a favoured in-group based on evaluative distinctiveness between in-
groups and out-groups (Hogg and Abrams, 2003).  In addition, self-categorization theory 
extends SIT to include the notion that these group members gain a descriptive and evaluative 
sense of their own personal identity through the comparison of the in-group to a salient out-
group (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Hogg and Abrams, 2003).  This comparison is done by 
creating a prototype within that in-group, which helps to describe and prescribe a person’s 
perceptions, attitudes, feelings and behaviours (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Hogg and Abrams, 
2003).  Individuals will then associate or disassociate themselves with certain groups in order 
to view themselves in a more positive manner (Ashforth et al., 2008). This is guided by the 
pursuit of an evaluative positive social identity, which is obtained through positive intergroup 
distinctiveness (Ashforth et al., 2008).   
 The term ‘identity’ was constructed within SIT to explain the intergroup behaviors that 
occur.  Within a course of a person’s life, individuals will associate themselves with multiple 
identities which will have an impact on their behaviour.  How much the different identities 
affect an individual’s behavior depend on certain characteristics (salience and strength) and 
the level (situated and deep-structured) of the identity.  Identity salience and strength are 
discussed next, followed by a discussion of the different levels of social identity.  
                                                                            16 
2.2.1 Identity Characteristics 
Two main characteristics of identity, salience and strength, stem directly from SIT.  
Salience is defined as the degree to which an identity will stand out compared to other 
identities in a particular situation.  When multiple identities exist, their respective salience 
will determine which identity comes forward to guide behavior (Ashforth et al., 2008).  
Identity salience will increase with identity cues and can be activated even by just mentioning 
the in-group (Van Dick et al., 2005).  The second characteristic, strength of the identity, is 
defined as the degree to which an identity is associated with an individual’s sense of self.  
Strong identification with the in-group creates a bias that leads to increased effort and 
information sharing within that in-group (Ashforth et al., 2008).  This identification can range 
in the level of overall strength.  The more the group members share certain perceptions and 
traits, the stronger the identity will become (Kriener and Ashforth, 2004). 
  Many studies have shown salience and strength to be intertwined, but Forehand et al. 
(2002) have shown that they are two distinct constructs.  Identity strength can have an effect 
on how salient an identity will be.  Stronger identities may be made salient more easily as 
individuals will perceive these identities to be more relevant.  However, these strong identities 
can be low in salience when they are not perceived relevant in the situation.  Weak identities 
can also have high or low salience depending on the situation. 
2.2.2 Identity Levels 
Also stemming from SIT is the concept of different identity levels: situated and deep-
structured (Rousseau, 1998).  Situated identification is fleeting or temporary, is usually 
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brought on by certain situational cues or social categories, and only persists as long as the 
cues are present (Rousseau, 1998).  Identity becomes situated when individuals perceive the 
affiliated group identity as having features in common with their own self-concept (Pratt, 
1998).   
Deep structured identification differs from situated identity in that it is caused by a 
much more fundamental connection with the group.  Deep structured identity develops over 
time through the group's norms and beliefs. Individuals emulate group members and 
internalize the group’s identity with their own self-concepts (Pratt, 1998).  These effects are 
lasting and harder to lose than those of situated identity.  However, situated identity can be 
strengthened over time and may eventually become a deep structured identity (Ashforth et al., 
2008).  This change can occur through common interests or common goals (Rousseau, 1998).   
Salience and strength can apply to either situated or deep structured identities, however, 
situated identities that are not salient have very little relevance to the individual.   
2.2.3 Organizational Identity 
 Throughout my thesis I use the term “employee identity” and focus on how this type 
of identity will impact the behavior of both the IA and the employee sharing information with 
the IA.  Employee identity is a type of identity, based on SIT, which stems from 
organizational identity (OI), where OI is defined as the perception of belonging to an 
organization (Mael and Ashforth, 1992).  OI is considered a more permanent and deep 
structured identity (Van Knippenberg and Van Schie, 2000).   The individual identifies him or 
herself with an organization, and, in turn, the organization provides the individual with a 
                                                                            18 
sense of identity.8  Although organizational identity focuses on the organization as a whole, it 
can also be apparent at the unit level as work group identity.  Brewer (1991) finds that 
individuals are more likely to identify with smaller groups.  This is caused by the desire to 
obtain both inclusiveness and exclusiveness with the group.  Organizations provide the 
individual with inclusiveness (membership to a group), but, due to the size of many 
organizations, there is a lack of exclusiveness.  Work-group identity provides individuals with 
both inclusiveness and exclusiveness and therefore, provides a much stronger identity 
(Kriener and Ashforth, 2004).  Exclusiveness is obtained because individuals perceive strong 
similarities with their work-group based on actual work performed, such as through 
performing common work related tasks.  Also, individuals spend most of their organizational 
life in these work-groups, which creates familiarity (Moreland and Beach, 1992) and also 
strengthens work group identity.     
2.2.4 Social Norms 
 One way an identity can influence an individual’s behavior is through the group’s 
social norms.  This is because the identity (in-group) will have certain social norms that all 
members are expected to adhere to in order to be a member (King, 2002; Akerlof and 
Kranton, 2010). Social norms are defined by Bicchieri (2006) as the customary rules that help 
control the behavior of a specific group.  When a certain group creates a set of rules or 
                                                     
8 Organizational identity differs from organizational commitment.  Commitment represents a positive attitude 
toward the organization, where the self and the organization remain two separate entities (Van Knippenberg and 
Van Schie, 2000).  Organizational identity is a perceived oneness with the organization (Ashforth et al., 2008).  
Research has suggested that strong organizational identity can help to increase affective organizational 
commitment (Meyer, et al., 2004). 
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regulations, they are attempting to form the social norms of that group, basically stating “this 
is how the members of our group are expected to behave.”  Bicchieri (2006) develops a model 
of social norms to help explain how norms can be used to guide action.   Her model requires 
two conditions to be satisfied in order for a social norm to exist.  The first condition is a 
sufficient number of people need to be aware that the norm exists and, second, there must be a 
sufficient number of people that have a “conditional preference” to adhere to that norm.  This 
conditional preference is based upon the expectations that others have for the individual in 
question and upon any empirical evidence held by the individual about adherence to the norm.  
Therefore compliance or activation of a social norm is dependent on knowing what is 
expected of you from the group as a whole.  This activation of a social norm can also have a 
positive effect on group identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010).  Social norms not only 
strengthen an identity with the specific group, but they also can make that group identity more 
salient to the individual (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010).   
 In the accounting literature, King (2002) finds an auditor’s affiliation with a 
professional organization or group can help to activate certain social norms within that group.  
These professional organizations or groups can also create social norms through the creation 
of certain rules of conduct or codes of ethics for that group.  The activation of social norms 
can also be seen empirically in a recent study by Davidson and Stevens (2013).  In their study, 
investors are asked to provide funds to a manager.  The manager earns a return on these funds 
valued at three times the value of the initial funds invested and then must return some funds to 
the investor.  The manager’s return behavior was measured as the percent of funds returned to 
the investor by the manager.  Investor confidence is measured as the percent of total funds the 
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investor provides to the manager initially.  The researchers find that having managers state 
that they will adhere to a code of ethics before performing the task helps to improve manager 
return behavior and investor confidence through the activation of social norms.  The code of 
ethics cued the managers to what behavior was expected of them as members of the 
management team.   
This idea of cueing individuals with social norms can also be seen in Mazar et al. 
(2008), in which the authors use the “attention to standards” mechanism to predict that when 
moral standards are more accessible, people will need to confront the meaning of their 
actions.  The attention to standards mechanism predicts that the cueing of moral standards, a 
form of social norm, can increase an individual’s honesty as expected of them as a member of 
that group. Therefore, this manipulation specifically relies on making the social norms salient 
to the individual.  In their experiment, Mazar et al. (2008) require participants to write down 
the Ten Commandments.  This cueing makes salient a very general social norm and is strong 
enough to remind people what standards society generally expects them to adhere to.  The 
researchers argue and find that when standards become more accessible, people pay more 
attention to their own actions and expectations put on them by the social group.  Bateson et al. 
(2006) found a similar result by cueing individuals to the fact that they were being watched.  
Again, this cueing made the individual more aware of their actions and improved their 
cooperation because they become aware of the salient social norms and what others, or their 
group, expected of them.   
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2.2.5 Accounting Literature Using SIT 
Social Identity Theory (SIT) has been around for many decades within the psychology 
literature, but has also been found to play a role in accounting with the literature focusing 
mainly on an accountant’s various identities with their organization, with their clients and 
within their profession.  One of the earliest accounting studies featuring SIT is Chatman 
(1991).  This study found that a strong similarity between staff accountants’ values and their 
accounting firms’ values (i.e. identification) was associated with higher job satisfaction and 
longevity with the firm.  Since then however, most of the SIT research focuses mainly on 
identity conflicts that external auditors face.  Research has shown that auditors have three 
main identities to deal with in their position; client firm identity, accounting firm identity (i.e., 
organizational identity) and professional bodies’ identity (i.e., professional identity). 
Particularly, the conflict between client and professional identity has prompted research 
because of the concern that audit firms push for value-added services, which may undermine 
an auditors’ professionalism.   
Focusing on this conflict, King (2002) used an experiment with actual auditors to 
determine if auditor decisions can be biased based on communications with an organization’s 
management, which is used to form an identity with the client.  King found that these 
communications with management caused the auditor to focus more on saving the firm money 
(while providing a lower quality audit) than creating a higher quality audit since that would be 
expensive for the firm.  This helped to show client identity contributes to an in-group bias, or 
favouritism, although when a salient social norm manipulation was added, this bias was 
neutralized.  The manipulation entailed having auditors interact with fellow auditors before 
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making their decisions.  This helped to create a salient social norm within their professional 
identity, increasing the psychological cost of a poor quality audit.  Also, this affiliation acted 
like a “team identity”, which motivated auditors to focus on the collective goal of conducting 
appropriate audits.   
 In reality, the “team identity” that King (2002) created does exist.  It is parallel to an 
auditor’s association with a professional organization such as the organization of Certified 
Public Accountants (CPA) or the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA).  The accreditations these 
organizations provide tie auditors to their codes of ethical conduct.  Accreditation of this kind 
is commonly pursued prior to developing an affiliation with an accounting firm and remains 
after the auditor leaves that firm.  Research has shown that this professional affiliation is 
separate and precedes organizational identity (Aranya et al., 1981).  Bamber and Iyer (2002) 
examine the relationship between the professional identity and the organizational identity of 
external auditors.  Overall, Bamber and Iyer find high levels of both professional and 
organizational identity within a sample of auditors and find that these two identities are highly 
correlated and, overall show a low level of organizational-professional identity conflict.   
 Bamber and Iyer (2007) also rely on SIT to investigate another major concern of audit 
regulators, that is, auditor independence.  External auditors work closely with and need to be 
very familiar with the client in order to plan and perform an effective audit.  Regulators are 
concerned that this familiarity may hinder auditor independence.  Bamber and Iyer (2007) 
surveyed 252 practicing external auditors to test whether this familiarity creates a client 
identification that would reduce auditor independence. Results indicate that auditors do in fact 
identify with their clients, and that auditors with higher client identification are more likely to 
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agree with a client-preferred position on controversial audit issues.  They also measured 
professional identity and found auditors with high professional identity are less likely to agree 
with a client-preferred position.  These results are consistent with the literature indicating that 
a strong professional identity can help maintain auditor independence. 
Warren and Alzola (2009) theoretically expand on this line of research and discuss 
how the threat to auditor independence is dependent on the saliency of professional identity 
among auditors. The authors focus on the process of making professional identity salient 
within the auditor.  By emphasizing an auditor community and auditor expertise, the authors 
posit professional identity salience will increase leading to the maintenance of auditor 
independence.   
In summary, accounting literature has mainly used SIT to focus on the conflict 
between an external auditor’s client and professional identities.  Studies have documented an 
in-group bias, or favouritism, that can occur and/or be neutralized due to these different 
identities. In the next chapter I will rely on this literature to hypothesize how an IAs behavior 
can be affected by their organizational and professional identities. Next, I will summarize the 
information sharing literature. 
2.3  Sharing Information 
As established in the SIT literature, group members generally share more information 
with in-group members than out-group members.  To understand how specific types of 
information, especially negative information, will affect an employee’s willingness to share 
information I focus on the information sharing literature.  Sharing information within the 
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organization has mainly been studied within the psychology literature and is typically referred 
to as “employee voice” (Van Dyne et al., 2003; Dutton and Ashford, 1993; Frese et al., 1999; 
Graham, 1986; Howell and Higgins, 1990; LePine and Van Dyne, 1998; Morrison and Phelps, 
1999; Withey and Cooper, 1989; Zhou and George, 2001).  Although voice is an important 
concept, this concept only focuses on one side of the decision by an employee, which is to 
share information.  Employee “silence”, or the decision not to share information, is also 
important to consider (Morrison and Milliken, 2000; Pinder and Harlos, 2001).  The key 
difference between voice and silence is not necessarily the act of speaking or not, but the 
individual’s motivation to withhold or share the information (Van Dyne et al, 2003).    
Specifically, organizational silence is defined as “withholding genuine expression 
about behavioral, cognitive, and/or affective evaluations of organizational circumstances to 
people who seem capable of changing the situation” (Pinder and Harlos, 2001).  This act can 
be seen as a conscious decision to withhold relevant information based on philosophical and 
ethical concerns (Bok, 1983).  Much of the silence literature focuses on reasons why 
employees fail to share negative information (Tangirala and Ramanujam, 2008; Van Dyne et 
al., 2003).  For example, employees tend to remain silent about conflicts with coworkers, 
disagreements with management decisions, personal knowledge of potential weaknesses in 
work processes, and concerns about illegal behaviors (Morrison and Milliken, 2000).  
 Pinder and Harlos (2001) define two basic forms of organizational silence. The first, 
acquiescent silence, is defined as the passive withholding of relevant information due to 
resignation or submission.  This occurs when an individual believes their ideas will not be 
used or acknowledged.  The second, quiescent silence (also known as defensive silence), is 
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defined as the active withholding of information to protect oneself.  This is based on a fear of 
the consequences of speaking up.  Van Dyne et al. (2003) expand this work and propose a 
third type of silence, pro-social silence.  Pro-social silence is based on organizational 
citizenship behavior and is defined as the withholding of work-related information with the 
goal of benefiting the organization.  An example of pro-social silence is an employee 
protecting organizational proprietary knowledge (Van Dyne et al., 2003).  Both defensive and 
pro-social silence are based on fear of repercussions from sharing information.  As intensity 
of the perceived threat is increased, there is an increase in the chance of silence being invoked 
due to the increase in fear (Kish-Gephart et al., 2009).  A majority of the time, all types of 
organizational silence end up being detrimental to the company (Morrison and Milliken, 
2000).  Therefore, employee activation of silence will depend on the threat of that 
information, or the severity of that information.  Specifically, when asked for information, not 
only will the employee’s interest in protecting the organization drive organizational silence, 
but silence will also depend on who asks for the information.   
Organizational silence is very similar to the construct “knowledge hiding” which 
comes from the knowledge sharing literature, and specifically focuses on the withholding of 
negative information.  Overall, the knowledge sharing literature, which differs from employee 
silence in that it focuses on sharing of information to contribute to knowledge application, 
innovation, and ultimately the competitive advantage of the organization (Jackson et al., 
2006), also recognizes that identity plays a role in an individual’s reasons to share 
information.  Although knowledge hiding often involves deception, this is not always the 
case. The term “knowledge hiding” was constructed to explain the intentional act of 
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withholding information from others (Connelly et al., 2012).  This concept differs from 
knowledge sharing in terms of the intent of the individual.  An individual may unintentionally 
fail to share information, which would not be considered knowledge hiding.  In general, 
knowledge hiding is affected by the relationship between the individuals involved.  
Specifically, distrust has been found to be a major predictor of knowledge hiding.  Distrust 
stems from a negative relationship or the concerns of the other individual sharing different 
cultural values (Sitkin and Roth, 1993).   
Edmondson (2003) provides quantitative evidence of how relationships can affect 
knowledge sharing.  In her study, she investigates 16 operating teams learning to use a new 
technology and finds that the relationship between the team and the team leader can 
encourage or discourage information sharing.  Leaders that could remove status barriers 
between themselves and their team increased overall information sharing, which helped 
ensure successful implementation of new technology.   
Additionally, a study by Milliken, Morrison and Hewlin (2003) was able to help 
explain why individuals would or would not share relevant information within the workplace.  
The researchers conducted interviews within the work place, focusing on a variety of issues in 
which the interviewee had chosen to remain silent.  They found that fear plays an important 
role in motivating silence.  This fear was driven by the potential negative outcomes that could 
occur from speaking up.  This study points to the strong use of defensive silence within the 
workplace.  Therefore, the decision between choosing voice or silence will depend on factors 
including the severity of the information, the status of the individual requesting the 
information, and who or what will be harmed by this information.  As the motivations for 
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being silent are removed, individuals have more reason to share the information (i.e., express 
voice) to benefit the organization.  Table 1 shows a summary of the information sharing 
literature on which my hypotheses, discussed in the next chapter, are based.
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TABLE 1 
Summary of Information Sharing Literature 
 
Source: Definitions: References: 
Employee Voice: Intentional 
sharing of information by 
employee 
1) Agreeing due to low self-efficacy  
    (Acquiescent voice) 
2) Expressing ideas to shift attention away from self  
    (Defensive voice) 
3) Constructive ideas to benefit organization  
    (Pro-social voice) 
Van Dyne et al., 2003; Dutton and 
Ashford, 1993; Frese et al., 1999; 
Graham, 1986; Howell and Higgins, 
1990; LePine and Van Dyne, 1998; 
Morrison and Phelps, 1999; Withey 
and Cooper, 1989; Zhou and George, 
2001. 
 
Employee Silence: Lack of 
sharing information by the 
employee 
1) Passive withholding of relevant information due to  
     resignation or submission (Acquiescent silence) 
2) Active withholding of information to protect oneself      
    (Defensive silence) 
3) Withholding of work-related information with the goal of     
     benefiting other people or the organization  
     (Pro-social silence) 
 
Pinder and Harlos, 2001; Bok, 1983; 
Tangirala and Ramanujam, 2008; 
Van Dyne et al., 2003; Morrison and 
Milliken, 2000. 
Knowledge Sharing: Sharing of information to contribute to knowledge 
application, innovation, and ultimately the competitive 
advantage of the organization 
 
Jackson et al., 2006; Burgoon and 
Buller, 1996; Edmondson, 2003. 
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Chapter 3 
Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, I use the different streams of literature reviewed in the previous 
chapter to develop hypotheses about the effects on IAs when attempting to obtain and then 
assess internal control weaknesses.  Specifically, Hypothesis 1 uses the identity literature to 
predict that the IA’s in-group status with the employee will help create an in-group bias, 
resulting in the employee sharing more information with the IA than the EA.  Hypothesis 2 
uses the information sharing literature to predict that the increase in severity of the 
information will invoke silence through the fear of sharing and attempting to protect the 
organization as a whole, therefore high severity will magnify the effect predicted in H1.  
Hypothesis 3 uses the identity literature to predict that the IA’s in-group status, that is, their 
organizational identity, will bias their assessment of the information gathered.  Hypothesis 4 
uses theories around social norms to predict that any bias the IA exhibits when assessing 
information can be mitigated by making salient the norms of the IA’s profession.  Finally, 
Hypothesis 5 again uses social norms to predict that making the EA aware of the social norms 
of the IA’s professional group will allow the EA to become more comfortable in relying on 
the IA’s work. 
3.2 Organizational Identity 
Identity is defined as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his 
knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and 
emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1978).  This definition has also 
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been refined to include the notion that group members gain a descriptive and evaluative sense 
of identity through the comparison of the in-group to a salient out-group (Tajfel and Turner, 
1986).  Individuals will then associate or disassociate themselves with certain groups in order 
to view themselves in a more positive manner (Ashforth et al., 2008).  In-group identity is 
higher when group members share common perceptions and traits (Kriener and Ashforth, 
2004).   An organization can provide the individual with a sense of identity.  The salience of 
that identity will increase with identity cues and can be activated by just mentioning the in-
group status (Van Dick et al., 2005).9  Strong identification with the in-group creates a bias 
that leads to increased information sharing within that in-group (Ashforth et al., 2008).  
Therefore, I predict an employee will be more willing to share negative information with a 
member of their in-group (i.e., the IA) than with a member of their out-group (i.e., the EA). 
This prediction is formalized as follows:  
H1:     Employees will share more information about internal control 
weaknesses with the internal auditor than the external auditor.  
 
3.3  Severity of Weakness 
SOX 404 internal control assessment requires management and EAs to report on the 
internal controls of an organization (SOX, 2002). 10 The SEC has provided examples to help 
both management and EAs assess the level of severity of any identified internal control 
                                                     
9 Although SIT suggests this prediction will hold, an IA’s direct contact with the organization’s employees is in 
some cases minimal (IIA, 2011).  Thus, the employee may view the IA as part of their in-group as compared to 
the external auditor, but as part of the out-group as compared to other members of the employee's own 
department (Kriener and Ashforth, 2004).  Therefore, clarity of the comparative out-group is important for this 
hypothesis to hold. 
10 Typically the IA will be in charge of management’s assessment.  Therefore I refer to the IA instead of 
management throughout the paper.  
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weaknesses.  These weaknesses are classified according to professional standards as 
deficiencies (low severity), significant deficiencies (medium severity) and material 
weaknesses (high severity).  As previously stated, for silence to be invoked there needs to be a 
conscious decision to withhold relevant information based on philosophical and ethical 
concerns (Bok, 1983).  The decision to withhold relevant information increases with the 
intensity of threat that information provides (Kish-Gephart et al., 2009).  Therefore, as the 
severity of the weakness increases (from low to high), I expect an increase in silence (i.e., less 
information will be shared). 
 Since the IA specifically asks employees to provide information during the internal 
control evaluation interview process, employees should not be concerned about being heard.  
Therefore, I do not expect acquiescent silence to be invoked.  I do, however, expect both 
defensive and pro-social silence to be invoked.  Defensive silence is invoked when employees 
are concerned with reprisal against themselves or from fear (Milliken et al., 2003).  Therefore, 
I predict employees’ expectations of reprisal due to negative information shared to be lower 
when sharing with the IA than the EA, due to their in-group status with the IA. In-group 
members typically see each other in a more positive light than out-group members (Ashforth 
et al., 2008).  For pro-social silence to be invoked, individuals would be attempting to protect 
the organization by keeping information in-house (Van Dyne et al., 2003).  Again, I expect 
pro-social silence is less likely to be invoked when communicating with the IA as compared 
to the EA.   To summarize, theory suggests employees are more likely to withhold 
information (i.e., remain silent) about high severity internal control weaknesses compared to 
low severity internal control weaknesses, and in addition, they will be more likely to withhold 
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this information from an EA compared than an IA.  Combining the above expectations with 
H1, I predict the following interaction:  
  H2:  As the severity of the internal control weakness increases, the 
difference in the employee’s willingness to share information with the 
internal auditor as compared to the external auditor will be magnified. 
 
3.4 Internal Auditor Objectivity 
 Once the IA has gathered information, an objective assessment of the severity of the 
internal control weakness is paramount.  As stated previously, a major concern of external 
auditors when deciding to rely on the IA's internal control evaluation is the possibility of a 
biased assessment caused by their strong connection with the organization (i.e., their 
organizational identity).  The IA function has been shown in the past to be swayed by 
management (Ahlawat and Lowe, 2004; Glover et al., 2008) and to show a lack of objectivity 
(Gramling et al., 2012) due to this organizational identity.  The idea that an IA’s judgment 
may be biased is corroborated by a recent field study by Bedard and Graham (2011) using 
actual data from large audit firms.  They found that the IA typically classifies internal control 
deficiencies as less severe than they should be, which leads the EA to override these 
classifications. 
 These results are consistent with predictions of SIT.  As an IA works for a specific 
organization, an identity is created. Organizational identity is seen as the perception of 
belonging to an organization (Mael and Ashforth, 1992) and is considered permanent and 
deep structured (Van Knippenberg and Van Schie, 2000).  Also, SIT predicts that individuals 
typically make more positive evaluations of their in-group than their out-group (Ashforth and 
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Mael, 1989; Hogg and Terry, 2000). Therefore, it is likely the IA will view their in-group 
(i.e., members of the organization) in a more favorable light than they should, causing them to 
assess internal control weaknesses less severely than the external auditor who is expected to 
provide an independent assessment.11  This argument leads to the following hypotheses: 
H3a:  An internal auditor will assess internal control weaknesses less 
severely when their organizational identity is strong rather than weak.  
 
H3b:     An internal auditor with strong organizational identity will assess 
internal control weaknesses less severely than will an external auditor. 
  
 These hypotheses are not without tension given Stefaniak et al. (2012) (SHC) find that 
the IA participants in their experiment were actually less lenient with internal control 
evaluations as their employee identity increased.    I argue, as have others, (Ashforth et al., 
2008; Ashforth and Mael, 1989) that the in-group bias created by identity with the 
organization will cause individuals to see their firm in a more favourable light; therefore, I 
expect IA’s with high organizational identity to assess weaknesses less severely than they 
should.   I believe the differences between our predictions can be explained by the differences 
in the types of identities each study examines and their experimental settings.  
 IA’s in SHC were asked to make evaluations for a hypothetical organization, not their 
own organization; therefore organizational identity was measured based on their perceived 
identity with this hypothetical organization, not the IA’s actual organization.  This 
‘hypothetical employee identity’ is a situated identity, which is different from the deep 
                                                     
11 This independence is not necessarily in fact, but mainly in appearance. 
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structured “actual organizational” identity examined in the current study.12  Deep structured 
identity differs from situated identity in that it is caused by a much more fundamental 
connection with the group (Pratt, 1998).  Also, strong identity creates a strong in-group bias 
(Ashforth and Mael, 1989).  Based on prior results in the psychology literature (Ashforth and 
Mael, 1989; Ashforth et al., 2008), I expect the deep structured “actual” organizational 
identity to create an in-group bias causing a “blinding” of the IA to the level of severity of the 
internal control weaknesses within their own organization.  
3.5 Quality of Internal Control Evaluations 
Although many IAs have professional designations and/or are members of the IIA, we 
would expect their professional identity to not be as salient as an external auditor’s due to the 
lack of professional obligation to protect the public interest and the salient organizational 
identity that exists day to day.  To address this issue, the IIA has created a code of ethics for 
all IAs to follow, whether they are members of the IIA or not.  This code of ethics stresses the 
importance of objective and independent decision making.  In a recent study, Davidson and 
Stevens (2013) show that having managers state that they will adhere to a code of ethics 
improves manager return behavior and investor confidence through the activation of social 
norms.13 Social norms can not only strengthen an identity, but can also make that identity 
                                                     
12 SHC (2012) also acknowledged that their measure of identity may not be the same as an actual identity 
developed by an IA over time within an organization.  Although I use a vignette study, I ask the IA about their 
actual organization, so their responses are based on their actual deep structured organizational identity. 
 
13 Davidson and Stevens (2013) ran an experiment in which investors provided funds to a manager.  The 
manager earned a return 3 times the value of the initial funds.  Manager return behavior was measured by the 
percent of funds returned to the investor by the manager.  Investor confidence was the percent of total funds the 
investor provided to the manager initially. 
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more salient (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010).  For example, Mazar et al. (2008) use the attention 
to standards mechanism to predict that when moral standards (social norms) are more 
accessible, people will need to confront the meaning of their actions.  They use this 
mechanism to help explain how cueing individuals about moral standards can increase 
honesty.  Specifically, the attention to standards mechanism relies on salience.  They argue 
that when standards become more accessible, people will pay more attention to their own 
actions.  Bateson et al. (2006) found a similar result by cueing individuals to the fact that they 
were being watched.  Again, this cueing made the individual more aware of their actions and 
improved their cooperation.  In this current study, I focus on the social norms of the IAs’ 
professional group.  By reminding the IA of the presence of the IIA’s mandatory code of 
ethics, their profession’s standards (i.e., their professional norms) will become more salient.  
This will increase the IAs’ awareness of their own actions relative to the standards of behavior 
expected by the internal audit profession.  This increase in awareness will cue the IA to the 
need to more objectively assess internal control weaknesses.  Based on the above reasoning, I 
hypothesize the following: 
 H4a: Salient professional norms will attenuate the difference between an IA's 
assessment of internal control weaknesses when their organizational 
identity is strong rather than weak. 
 
H4b: Salient professional norms will attenuate the difference between an IA's 
assessment of internal control weaknesses, when their organizational 
identity is strong, and an EA's assessment of the same internal control 
weaknesses. 
 
 The salience of a mandatory code of ethics for IAs should also have an effect on the 
external auditor’s perception of the IA’s objectivity.  Glover et al. (2008) find external 
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auditors are more willing to rely on outsourced IAs than in-house IAs, which they found to be 
indirectly caused by the difference in perception of objectivity between the two groups.  They 
argue that external auditors see a close alignment between the IA and management, which 
affects their perception of the IAs objectivity.  SAS 65 requires the objectivity of the IA to be 
one of the main factors considered by the external auditor when considering the use of the 
IA’s previous work.  I expect that increasing the salience of the IA’s professional identity will 
improve the external auditors’ perception of IA objectivity and the EA will be more willing to 
rely on the IA’s work.14 This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H5: When the external auditor is aware that the internal auditor adheres to a 
set of professional norms, the external auditor will be willing to rely on 
the internal auditor’s work to a greater degree than when the external 
auditor is not aware. 
 
  To summarize, H1 and H2 focus on my first research question; will employees share 
more information about internal control weaknesses with the IA than the EA?  Particularly, 
H1 predicts that employees will share more information with the IA than the EA.  H2 predicts 
that as severity increases the difference in employee information sharing with IAs as 
compared to EAs will be increased.  Both H1 and H2 will be tested using Study one, which is 
discussed in chapter 4.  H3, H4, and H5 focus on my second research question; will the IA be 
able to objectively assess internal control weaknesses so that the EA can be confident in 
                                                     
14 The EAs reliance decision is based on an evaluation of three factors: work performance, competence and 
objectivity. (See Bame-Aldred et al., 2012 for a more detailed review of this topic).  I am only exploring 
differences in perceived objectivity in this study while holding work performance and competence constantly 
high. Future work might examine the inter-relationships between objectivity, competence and work performance 
from the perspective of social identity.   
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relying on the IA’s work?  H3 predicts that when professional norms are not salient IAs with 
strong OI will assess internal control weaknesses less severely than EAs and IAs with weak 
OI.  H4 predicts that the salient professional norms of the IAs professional group will 
attenuate the difference in assessment between EAs and IAs.  Finally H5 predicts that EAs 
that are aware of the strong IA’s professional norms will rely on the IAs work more than EAs 
that are not aware of the strong IA’s professional norms.  H3, H4, and H5 will be tested in 
study 2 and will be discussed in chapter 5.  Table 2 summarizes all predictions. 
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TABLE 2 
Summary of Hypotheses and Theories 
 
Study 1: Theory: Prediction: 
H1: Social Identity Theory Employees will share more information about internal control weaknesses with the internal 
auditor than the external auditor. 
H2: Social Identity Theory 
and Organizational 
Silence 
 
As the severity of the internal control weakness increases, the difference in the employee’s 
willingness to share information with the internal auditor as compared to the external 
auditor will be magnified. 
   
Study 2: Theory: Prediction: 
H3: Organizational Identity  An IA will assess internal control weaknesses less severely when their organizational 
identity is strong rather than weak and less severely than an EA. 
H4: Organizational Identity 
and Social Norms 
Salient professional norms will attenuate the difference between an IA's assessment of 
internal control weaknesses when their organizational identity is strong rather than weak 
and between an EA’s assessments. 
 
H5: Social Norms When the EA is aware that the IA adheres to a set of professional norms, the EA will be 
willing to rely on the IA’s work to a greater degree than when the EA is not aware. 
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Chapter 4 
Study One 
4.1 Experimental Method 
 Study one focuses on my first research question; does the “employee” identity the IA 
assumes within the organization allow them the opportunity to discover more internal control 
weaknesses within their organization than would an EA? I design a 2 X 2 mixed factorial lab 
experiment to test Hypothesis 1 and 2.  The experiment consists of manipulating employee 
social identity with the auditor (high/low) between subjects and the severity of the internal 
control weaknesses (high/low) within subjects.  
 I make two separate predictions that are tested in Study one.  Hypothesis 1 predicts a 
main effect of organizational identity, in that employees of an organization will be willing to 
share more information about internal control weaknesses with the IA than the EA. 
Hypothesis 2 predicts an interaction of identity and severity, in that as the severity of the 
identified control system weakness increases, the difference between the willingness of the 
employee to share the information with the IA rather than the EA will also increase.  Below I 
describe the experimental design of Study one and analyze the results. 
4.1.1 Participants 
 I recruited participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) platform.  I 
recruited organizational employees that, in their current position, had interacted with either an 
EA or IA in the past.  I ran a pre-screening survey through MTurk which required participants 
to be currently working in an office setting, to have experience interacting with auditors and 
to not be an auditor themselves.  The pre-screening survey was used to ensure the participants 
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would be members of the relevant population and would see the experimental scenario as 
realistic.  While 227 potential participants attempted the screening questionnaire, 85 
participants qualified and completed the experiment online.15  Each participant that completed 
the experiment was paid through the Amazon MTurk system.16 
4.1.2 Experimental Procedures 
After completing the pre-screening questionnaire, participants moved to the main 
experiment. In this experiment, participants were asked to play the role of an employee within 
a fictitious organization, XYZ, Inc.  Next, participants were told that an internal control 
assessment was occurring within the organization.  To ensure the participants did not think 
they had been singled out, they learned they had been randomly selected to be interviewed by 
the auditor performing the assessment.  All participants learned that the internal control 
assessment was standard and that the auditor was interested in information about all possible 
control system weaknesses, no matter the level of severity or materiality.  
At that point, social identity with the auditor was manipulated.  Half of the participants 
were told they would be interviewed by an IA and the other half by an EA.  I ensured the 
participants were aware that the IA was an employee of their same organization (i.e., within 
their in-group) while the external auditor was not (i.e., in the out-group).  Participants were 
                                                     
15 To estimate the number of participants that would be required given the estimated effect size, I used the 
statistical software program G*Power, a popular statistical analysis program used in both social and behavioral 
research viewed as a valid and reliable tool throughout both research communities (Faul et al., 2007). Based on 
prior identity research (Stefaniak et al., 2012) and to be conservative, I assumed a small effect size and required 
significance at 95% resulting in a required sample size of 85 participants. 
16 Participants were paid $.50 to attempt the pre-screening survey and an additional $1 if they qualified and 
completed the main survey.  The main survey took about 15 minutes of time and this payment amount is typical 
of other Amazon Mturk surveys. 
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also asked to assume they had not had any previous experience with this particular auditor.  
This was to eliminate any preconceived opinions of the auditor.  At this point, a 
comprehension check question was asked and a correct answer was needed to continue. 
Next, all participants were provided with a list of internal control weaknesses that they 
were asked to imagine they had become aware of during the year. These internal control 
weaknesses involved the within-subject manipulation of the severity of the internal control 
weakness. All participants were also told that the auditor might or might not learn about these 
weaknesses from other employees and that the auditor was unaware that the employee had 
this information.  All participants were then asked to indicate their willingness to share this 
information with the auditor (i.e., the dependent variable), their degree of comfort in sharing 
this information with the auditor and their reasons for these judgments.  Also, participants 
were asked why they would not share this information as a process measure (silence 
measure).  Finally, I asked an auditor identity manipulation check question and other relevant 
demographic questions.  Figure 1 summarizes the experimental design flow and Appendix A 
provides all information provided to the participants during the experiment. 
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FIGURE 1 
Experiment 1: Flow Chart 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Demographic Questions 
Judgments Collected: 
DV:  Likelihood to Share Information 
Potential Controls/ Covariates: Comfort to Share Information,  
Identity with own organization  
Process variables: Reasons for Likelihood, Reasons for Comfort, Reasons for Silence 
 
 
Prescreen (Used on Amazon MTurk to ensure proper participants) 
 
 
 
Provided List of Known IC Weaknesses of Low and High Severity 
Manipulation Check: 
1. Auditor Identity 
2. Severity of identified weaknesses  
High Auditor Identity Manipulation: 
1. Scenario provided containing internal 
auditor information 
2. Comprehension check question  
3. Internal control assessment explained 
Low Auditor Identity Manipulation: 
1. Scenario provided containing 
external auditor information 
2. Comprehension check question 
3. Internal control assessment explained 
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4.1.3 Independent Variables 
Employee Social Identity with the Auditor  
 To manipulate employee social identity with the auditor, I varied the type of auditor 
(internal or external) that the participants were told conducted the interview.  Participants 
within the IA condition were told that the internal control assessment was being conducted 
across the whole organization by the internal audit department.  They also learned that the 
assessment was used to fulfill management’s SOX 404 requirements.  I also controlled for IA 
quality by stating “In the past the IA has been assessed by the external auditor as being 
competent and objective”, and “although the IA is performing the procedures necessary to 
fulfill management’s SOX 404 requirement, they report to the Audit Committee, ensuring 
independence.”  The participants being interviewed by the IA were provided details to 
increase the salience of the IA's organizational in-group status.  Wording such as “the IA is 
part of the organization”, “the IA’s office is within the same building as yours”, and “the IA is 
paid in a similar manner to yourself” is used to create similarities, which are needed to create 
an in-group status (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Hogg and Terry, 2000). Wording such as “you 
will be interviewed by an internal auditor as compared to an external auditor” also helped to 
ensure the salience of the in-group vs. out-group status.   
 Participants within the EA condition were told that the assessment was being 
conducted across the whole organization by the external auditor.  They also learned that this 
assessment was be used to fulfill management’s SOX 404 requirements.  EA quality was 
controlled with the following wording, “The external auditing firm is a reputable 
organization” and “the external auditor only reports to supervisors within their own 
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organization and is completely independent” Although this wording created a difference 
between conditions, it was necessary to ensure EA quality is constant and controlled for.  
(Refer to Appendix A for exact wording used in each condition). The participants being 
interviewed by the EA were provided details to show that the EA was not part of their 
organizational in-group.  Wording such as “the EA is part of a 3rd party organization”, “the 
EA’s office is located on the other side of town”, and “the EA is paid directly by their own 
firm.”  Based on previous research, this should be sufficient to create an out-group status 
(Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Hogg and Terry, 2000). 
Perceived Severity of Internal Control Weaknesses 
The internal control weaknesses used within this experiment were created from 
examples provided by the SEC, the PCAOB, accounting firms and previous accounting 
research.  I first created a total of 11 control system weaknesses of various levels of severity 
in order to test how the severity of the negative information affects the participant’s 
willingness to share it.  To ensure differences in perceived severity of control system 
weaknesses, I first recruited 120 audit undergraduate and graduate students from the 
University of Waterloo to complete an online survey designed using Surveymonkey.com.  
The students were presented with the 11 internal control system weaknesses (See complete 
list in Appendix C) and asked to assess the severity of each one on a seven point scale with 1 
= Low in Severity and 7 = High in Severity.  Based on these ratings, I selected the six 
weaknesses listed in Table 3 (Panel A) with mean severity ratings ranging from very severe 
(e.g., IC1 with mean = 6.33, SD = 1.05) to relatively low in terms of severity (e.g., IC6 with 
mean= 3.21, SD 1.40).   
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I conducted an additional pretest of perceived severity of the six selected internal 
control system weaknesses with participants recruited through Amazon Mturk to determine if 
perceived severity level would differ between the auditing students and participants recruited 
on Mturk.  A total of 110 employees were recruited through Amazon Mturk and attempted the 
pre-survey screening test.  All individuals were screened to ensure they worked in a business 
setting, were not an auditor, and had experience working with an auditor in the past.  After 
pre-screening, 40 participants qualified and completed the experiment online.  Over 50 
percent of the participants were between 30 and 50 years of age and all were at least 20 years 
of age.  Participants had at least 4 years work experience and over 50percent had more than 
10 years of work experience. Also, 47 percent were male and 75 percent had previously 
participated in an internal control assessment.  
Means and standard deviations of internal control weakness severity ratings for this 
sample are presented in the second column of Table 3 (Panel A). Overall, I found similar 
results to those in the initial pretest with auditing students.  I also presented the list of 
weaknesses in reverse order for half of these Mturk participants to test for order effects and 
found none.  I note that IC3a and IC3b were developed originally for use as a proximity 
manipulation (i.e., did the weakness occur within the employee's own department or in a 
different department?).  This manipulation did not work as expected in further pretesting of 
the study so I removed this manipulation and related control system weaknesses in the final 
version of the study.  
To limit the number of weaknesses, and thus requirements on participants’ time to 
complete the study, the two highest severity weaknesses (IC1 and IC2) and the two lowest 
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severity weaknesses were selected (IC5 and IC6) to be used in the final study.  Through paired 
t-tests I confirmed that IC1 and IC2 (high severity) were rated as significantly more severe than 
the low severity weaknesses IC5 and IC6 (all p < 0.001). The results from this pretest also 
highlighted certain adjustments needed for the final study. In particular, I made some minor 
adjustments to the wording of the four IC weaknesses to improve their clarity.  
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TABLE 3  
                  Pretests of Perceived Severity of Identified Control System Weaknesses  
 
Internal Control System Weaknesses 
Audit 
students 
[n=120] 
Mean 
(std. dev.) 
MTurk 
participants 
[n=40] 
Mean 
(std. dev.) 
IC1 An employee with password protected access to confidential client information stores their password on 
a sticky note underneath their keyboard.  Client information includes credit card and SI insurance numbers. 
6.33 
(1.05) 
5.83 
(0.97) 
IC2 Sales personnel frequently modify the terms of the company’s standard sales contracts and there is not a 
review process in place to approve these changes. The nature of the modifications can affect the timing and 
amount of revenue recognized. Individual sales transactions are frequently significant to the entity, and the 
gross margin can vary significantly for each transaction. 
5.42 
(1.37) 
5.05 
(1.22) 
IC3a (Close to employee) There seems to be a level of undue bias or lack of objectivity from those responsible 
for accounting estimates with your department.  For example, consistent understatement of expenses or 
overstatement of allowances at the direction of your direct supervisor has occurred. 
5.25 
(1.44) 
5.32 
(1.15) 
IC3b (Far from employee) There seems to be a level of undue bias or lack of objectivity from those 
responsible for accounting estimates within some departments.  For example, consistent understatement of 
expenses or overstatement of allowances at the direction of other departments’ managers has occurred. 
5.25 
(1.44) 
5.32 
(1.15) 
IC4 A lack of segregation of duties over the company’s shipping and receiving and the inventory record-
keeping functions have been noted. This resulted in underreporting of inventory levels and an understatement 
of company-wide net income by 3.8%. The misstatement was detected by management and corrected prior to 
issuing external financial reports. 
4.68 
(1.43) 
4.29 
(1.23) 
IC5 Salespeople gave discounts to customers and failed to record them on the customer order. In most 
instances, adjustments to revenue were made without contacting these salespeople. 
4.37 
(1.40) 
3.80 
(1.41) 
IC6 The company has a written policy outlining when it is appropriate to provide meals to employees and 
requires a list of all attendees. Many times documentation supporting meals and refreshment expenses at large 
company meetings does not generally show who attended these meetings or why attendees required food and 
refreshments to conduct business. 
3.21 
(1.40) 
2.85 
(1.25) 
Note: Perceived severity was rated on a 7 point scale with 1=low severity and 7= high severity
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4.1.4 Dependent Variable 
The main dependent variable of interest was the participants' judged likelihood to 
share negative information about internal control weaknesses with the auditor.  Likelihood to 
share (LTS) was measured using a 7-point Likert scale, with 1 = highly unlikely to share 
information and 7 = highly likely to share information.  Open ended questions requesting the 
reason why the participants would or would not be likely to share the information were asked 
to better understand the reasons behind information sharing choices.17  
4.1.5  Covariate and Demographics 
 An important and potentially significant covariate is the participant’s degree of 
identity with the organization in which they are employed. This is the level of organizational 
identity they bring with them to the experiment independent of the identity with the auditor 
manipulated within the experiment itself.  To measure organizational identity, I use a 
modified version of Mael and Ashforth’s (1992) six question scale.18   
  I also collected demographic information to test for possible effects of other possible 
determinants of the participants’ behavior, although I expect these should be reasonably 
controlled via random assignment of participants to conditions.  These variables include age, 
sex, years of work experience and whether or not the participant has previously been involved 
in an internal control assessment. 
                                                     
17 Some analysis of these responses can be found in the results section. 
18 Items making up this scale and related descriptive statistics are presented in the results section (Table 7) 
below.  
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4.2 Results – Study One 
4.2.1 Participants 
A total of 227 employees attempted the pre-screening survey through Amazon Mturk.  
The pre-screening survey was used to ensure the participants currently worked in a business 
setting, they were not auditors, and they had experience working with an auditor in the past.  
After pre-screening, 85 participants qualified and completed the experiment online. Of the 85 
qualified participants, over 50 percent were between 30 and 50 years of age and all were at 
least 20 years of age.  Of the 85 participants, 90 percent had at least 4 years of work 
experience and over 50 percent had more than 10 years of experience. Also, 51 percent were 
male and 75 percent had participated in an internal control assessment in the past.  Overall, 
the demographics of these participants were very similar to the pre-test participants recruited 
through Mturk. 
 Random assignment of participants to the two conditions appears to have been 
successful as age, experience, involvement in an internal control assessment, and sex do not 
vary significantly based on Auditor Type (all p > 0.10). However, to the extent that these 
characteristics have effects across all conditions, I do run all main hypothesis tests with the 
above variables as controls, and none turn out to be significant.  Also, none of these variables 
are correlated with the dependent variable Likelihood to Share.  Demographics data are 
reported in Table 4. 
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TABLE 4 
Participant Demographics [n = 85] 
 
Panel A: Demographics by Range,  Number, Percentage and Cumulative Percentage  
 
 Range: # % Cumulative % 
Work Experience: 
1-3 10 11.8 11.8 
4-6 11 12.9 24.7 
7-9 14 16.5 41.2 
10+ 50 58.8 100 
     
Sex: 
Male 44 51.8  
Female 41 48.2  
     
Age: 
20-30 27 31.8 34 
31-40 35 41.2 72.9 
41-50 12 14.1 87.1 
>50 11 12.9 100 
     
Experience with previous 
IC assessment: 
Yes 64 75.3  
No 21 24.7  
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4.2.2 Manipulation Checks 
All participants were asked a comprehension check question to ensure they understood 
whether an internal or external auditor was interviewing them. All participants answered this 
question correctly before they rated their likelihood to share this information with the auditor. 
In addition, to test for the success of the experimental manipulation of employee social 
identity with the auditor, I used a modified version of the Inclusion of Others in Self Scale 
(Aron et al., 2004) as used in SIT research in psychology.  This scale provided the participant 
with seven images of two overlapping circles labeled 'self' and 'auditor'.  These images range 
from no overlap (weak identity) to almost complete overlap (strong identity).19 A sample of 
the scale is presented in Appendix A. Results indicate the manipulation worked well as there 
was a significant difference between conditions (F=22.763, p<0.001).  Results can be found in 
Table 5.   
                                                     
19 Several previous studies in accounting have used a measure of social identity modified by Bamber and Iyer 
(2007). Their measure was derived from Mael and Ashforth (1992) and has been shown to provide similar results 
to the measure by Aron et al. (2004) that I use in this study.   Aron et al. (2004) have shown their measure to 
highly correlate with Mael and Ashforth’s (1992), but the ease of administering 1 question instead of 6 questions 
makes it a much more efficient measure. 
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TABLE 5 
Social Identity with the Auditor Manipulation Check [n=85] 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
 
Panel B: One way ANOVA of Employee Identity with Auditor Strength 
 
Source df F p-value 
Auditor Type 1 22.763 <0.001 
Total 83   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: 
Social Identity is measured using a modified version of the Inclusion of Others in Self Scale (Aron et 
al., 2004).  1 = no overlap of auditor and self circles, 7 = full overlap and self circles. 
 
Auditor Type IA indicates employee interviewed by internal auditor and EA indicates employee 
interviewed by external auditor.  
 
p-value is one tailed because one direction is expected for the manipulation. 
 
 
To test the effectiveness of the severity manipulation, all participants were asked to 
rate the severity of the four IC weaknesses on a scale of 1 = low severity and 7 = high 
severity. Participants rated the means of all four ICs as expected and consistent with the pilot 
test ratings. See Table 6 below for reported means and standard deviations.  Ex ante, IC1 and 
IC2 were both considered to be high severity weaknesses and IC5 and IC6 were considered to 
be low severity weaknesses. To confirm there is a difference between high and low perceived 
severities of identified control system weaknesses in this sample, I first run a one-way 
Mean 
(std. dev.)  
n 
Auditor Type  
IA  EA Overall 
Identity with Auditor 
5.450 
(1.863) 
38 
3.53 
(1.811) 
47 
4.39 
(2.065) 
85 
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ANOVA comparing high severity (IC1 and IC2) to low severity (IC5 and IC6) items.  I find a 
significant difference (F=101.27, p<0.001) between groups.  To determine if there is 
difference within the severity levels I run post-hoc adjusted paired sample t-tests comparing 
ICs within high/low severity groups. I do not find a significant difference between perceived 
severity of the high items, IC1 and IC2, (t=0.88, p=0.382).  However, I do find a significant 
difference between the low items, IC5 and IC6, (t=6.913, p<0.001).  Next, I ensure both low 
items severity is perceived differently from the high items by running further t-tests.  These t-
tests confirm there is a significant difference between both low items (IC5 and IC6) compared 
to both high items (IC1 and IC2); all at a p<0.001.  
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TABLE 6 
 Manipulation Check on Perceived Severity of Identified  
Internal Control System Weaknesses [n = 85] 
 
Panel A: Descriptives of ICs Severity Ratings 
 
 
Internal Control Weaknesses 
Mean 
(std. dev.) 
 
High Severity: 
 
IC1 Employees with password protected access to confidential client 
information stores their password on a sticky note underneath their 
keyboard.  Client information includes credit card numbers and Social 
Insurance numbers. 
 
5.48 
(1.76) 
IC2 Sales personnel frequently make unauthorized modifications to the 
terms of the company’s standard sales contracts and there is not a review 
process in place to approve these changes. The nature of the modifications 
can greatly affect the timing and amount of revenue recognized. Individual 
sales transactions are frequently significant to the entity, and the gross 
margin can vary significantly for each transaction. 
 
5.67 
(1.31) 
 
Low Severity: 
 
IC5 Salespeople gave discounts to customers and failed to record them on 
the customer order. In most instances, minor adjustments to revenue were 
made without contacting these salespeople. 
 
4.54 
(1.70) 
IC6 The company has a written policy outlining when it is appropriate to 
provide meals to employees and requires a list of all attendees. Many times 
documentation supporting these meals and refreshment expenses at large 
company meetings does not generally show who attended these meetings or 
why attendees required food and refreshments to conduct business. 
 
2.88 
(1.60) 
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Table 6 continued 
 
 
Panel B: One Way ANOVA of High (IC1 and IC2) vs Low (IC5 and IC6) Perceived 
Severity Ratings 
 
Source df F p-value 
Severity 1 101.27 <0.001 
Total 338   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel C: Paired Sample t-tests 
   
 
Effect 
Mean 
Error t df 
p-value 
(two-tailed) 
High severity:     
  IC1 vs IC2  0.214 0.880 84 0.382 
 
Low severity: 
    
  IC5 vs IC6 2.212 6.913 84 <0.001 
 
Between Severity: 
    
  IC1 vs IC5 0.251 10.352 84 <0.001 
  IC1 vs IC6 0.279 3.377 84 <0.001 
  IC2 vs IC5 0.230 12.115 84 <0.001 
  IC2 vs IC6 2.203 5.551 84 <0.001 
 
Notes: 
Perceived severity was rated on a 7 point scale with 1 = low severity and 7 = high severity. 
All t-test are post-hoc, therefore p-values are two tailed and adjusted accordingly. 
By construction and confirmed through pilot testing, IC1 and IC2 are considered high severity, 
whereas IC5 and IC6 and considered low severity. 
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4.2.3 Covariate 
To control for the participants’ level of identification with the organization they work 
for which is independent of the identity with the auditor as manipulated in this study, I 
measured organizational identity for all participants using a modified version of Mael and 
Ashforth’s (1992) six question scale. Items making up this scale and their related means (std. 
dev.) are presented in Table 7.  I use this measure to ensure that it is not the individual’s pre-
existing identity with their organization that is driving the overall results, but rather their 
identity with the auditor interviewing them as manipulated in the experiment.   
I conduct a confirmatory factor analysis on the responses to these six questions. As 
shown in Table 7, all factor loadings are greater than 0.71 and the overall factor has an 
eigenvalue (variance explained) of 4.275 (71.24%), with a Chronbach’s Alpha score of 0.917. 
Thus, this factor analysis indicates that these measures represent a single construct, which I 
call OrgID.  I use the mean scores for each participant to calculate OrgID20.   
  
                                                     
20 Results are similar when using factor scores instead of summated raw mean scores. 
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TABLE 7 
Descriptive Statistics and Exploratory Factor Analysis of Organizational Identity 
Control Variable (OrgID) [n=85]  
 
 
Item 
Mean 
(std. dev.) 
ORGID 
Factor Scores 
1. When someone criticizes my organization, it feels like   
    a personal insult. 
 
4.20 
(1.624) 
0.723 
2. I am very interested in what others think about my   
    organization. 
 
3.68 
(1.761) 
0.846 
3. When I talk about my organization, I usually say "we”  
     rather than “they”. 
 
3.85 
(2.003) 
0.792 
4. My organization’s successes are my successes. 3.91 
(1.843) 
0.921 
5. When someone praises my organization, it feels like a  
     personal compliment. 
 
3.89 
(1.786) 
0.904 
6. If a story in the media criticized my organization, I  
    would feel embarrassed. 
 
3.58 
(1.835) 
0.864 
Overall Mean  
(std. dev.) 
3.85 
(1.528) 
 
 
          Eigenvalue  
     % of Variance explained 
Chronbach alpha 
Composite Reliability 
 4.275 
71% 
0.917 
0.937 
 
Notes: 
OrgID is a measure of organizational identity using a modified version of Mael and Ashforth’s (1992) 
scale. Measured as 1 = Strongly agree to 7 = Strongly disagree.  
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4.2.4 Descriptive Statistics for Likelihood to Share  
 
Descriptive statistics for Likelihood to Share are reported in Table 8 and Figure 2. 
Because I intentionally constructed each IC weakness to have a different severity level, I 
mean centered each IC weakness based on each IC overall mean score.  This allows me to 
eliminate the differences found in severity for each IC and focus on the difference found 
between auditor types.  Therefore a positive (negative) mean indicates employees in a certain 
cell stated they were more (less) likely to share the specific IC than the mean of employees for 
that IC.  As expected, all means in the IA condition are positive (more likely to share) and in 
the EA condition are negative (less likely to share).   
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TABLE 8 
Descriptive Statistics for Likelihood to Share Weaknesses Measure (LTS) 
 
 
 
 
 
Raw Mean 
Centered Mean (std. dev.) 
n 
 
 
Auditor Type 
 Internal External Overall 
Severity 
 
IC1 (High) 
5.39 
0.759 (2.02) 
38 
4.02 
-0.614 (2.33) 
47 
4.64  
(2.29) 
85 
IC2 (High) 
5.73 
0.407 (1.91) 
38 
5.00 
-0.329 (2.07) 
47 
5.33  
(2.02) 
85 
IC5 (Low) 
4.36 
0.086 (1.85) 
38 
4.21 
-0.069 (2.28) 
47 
4.28 
 (2.09) 
85 
IC6 (Low) 
4.97 
0.150 (2.23) 
38 
4.70 
-0.121 (2.10) 
47 
4.82  
(2.15) 
85 
Overall 
4.93  
0.351 (1.59) 
38 
4.48 
-0.284 (1.56) 
47 
  4.68  
(1.57) 
85 
 
Notes: 
Likelihood to share weaknesses is rated on a scale of 1 = very unlikely to share through 7 = very 
likely to share. 
  
Auditor Type Internal for participants interviewed by an internal and external for participants 
interviewed by an external auditor. 
 
Severity differs at two levels: high (IC1 and IC2) and low (IC5 and IC6). IC1 through IC6 refers to 
the internal control weaknesses presented in Table 6. 
 
Raw Mean is the overall mean of each IC.  
 
Centered mean reported is created by centering on the overall mean for each IC.  
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FIGURE 2 
Means of Likelihood to Share by Auditor Type and Internal Control Weakness 
 
 
 
Notes: 
Centered mean: Each IC mean is centered around the overall mean for that specific IC. By 
construction, if severity ratings in the EA condition are negative, then those in the IA condition must 
be positive, as the mean for each IC is zero. See IC descriptions in Table 6. 
 
Likelihood to share weaknesses is rated on a scale of 1 = very unlikely to share through 7 = very 
likely to share.  
 
Auditor Type IA for participants interviewed by an internal auditor and EA for participants 
interviewed by an external auditor. 
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4.2.5 Hypothesis Tests 
In Hypothesis 1, I predict, based on social identity theory, that employees’ willingness 
to share information about control system weaknesses with the internal auditor will be higher 
than with the external auditor.  To test this hypothesis, I examine the effect of Auditor Type on 
their Likelihood to Share (LTS), using a repeated measures mixed model with LTS as the 
dependent variable, Auditor Type as the independent variable and two levels of Severity (high 
and low), with two repeated measures at each level. 21  The results presented in Table 9 below 
show a significant main effect of Auditor Type (F=5.199, p=0.012) providing support for 
Hypothesis 1.   
  
                                                     
20 As discussed previously, I do not include any covariates in this analysis because none of the demographic 
variables or OrgID were found to be significant predictors of LTS.  
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TABLE 9 
Tests of Hypothesis 1 and 2 [n = 85] 
 
Panel A: Repeated Measure Mixed Model ANOVA for Likelihood to Share (LTS)  
Effect 
Mean 
Squares F df 
p-value 
(one-tailed) 
Within:     
Severity 0.167 0.070 1 0.396 
Severity*Auditor Type 14.881 6.212 1 0.007 
Error 2.396  168  
     
Between:     
Auditor Type 33.824 5.199 1 0.012 
Error 6.505  168  
 
Panel B: Planned Comparisons   
 
Effect 
Mean 
Error t df 
p-value 
(one-tailed) 
High:     
    IA vs EA 0.323 3.260 83 0.001 
Low:     
    IA vs EA 0.324 0.653 83 0.251 
 
Notes:     
LTS is the participants’ likelihood to share weaknesses rated on a scale of 1 = very unlikely to share 
through 7 = very likely to share.  
 
Auditor type External auditor (EA) means participants were to assume they were providing 
information to an external auditor and Internal Auditor (IA) means participants were told they were 
providing information to the internal auditor. 
 
Severity has 2 levels; IC 1 and IC2 (High), and IC5 and IC6 (Low). 
 
p-values are one tailed as hypotheses are directional. 
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This result leads directly to Hypothesis 2 which predicts that as the severity of the internal 
control weakness increases, the difference in the employee’s willingness to share information 
with the internal auditor compared to the external auditor will be magnified.  To test 
Hypothesis 2, I use the same repeated measures Mixed Model that was used to test 
Hypothesis 1.  First, focusing on the repeated measures Mixed Model with LTS as the 
dependent variable and Auditor Type as the independent variable and two levels of Severity 
(high and low), with two repeated measures at each level, I find a significant interaction 
between Auditor Type and Severity (F=6.212, p=0.007).   
To help understand the form of the interaction, I use planned comparisons.  I expect to 
and do find that within the low Severity group there is no significant difference in LTS 
depending on Auditor Type (t=0.653, p=0.251), but when the IC weakness is in the high 
Severity category, there is a significant difference in LTS depending on Auditor Type 
(t=3.260, p<0.001).  These results provide support for H2 as the significant interaction found 
between Severity and Auditor Type is driven by individuals sharing more internal control 
weaknesses with the internal auditor compared to the external auditor, especially when the 
weakness is severe.   
4.2.6 Process Measures  
I expect and predict that individuals will share negative information differently 
depending on who is interviewing them because theory suggests that different types of silence 
are invoked depending on the interviewer.  I asked participants three questions based on the 
three different types of silence defined by Van Dyne et al. (2003); 1) “I do not believe I can 
make a difference” (acquiescent), 2) “I am fearful of the repercussions that could occur from 
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providing this information” (defensive) and 3) “I do not want to provide information that may 
hurt my organization” (pro-social).  Each question was answered on a scale from 1 = Least 
likely the reason I might hold back information to 7 = Most likely the reason I might hold 
back information. The descriptive statistics for each type of silence are report in Panel A of 
Table 10.  The means for acquiescent silence (IA=2.42, EA=2.72) are much lower than both 
defensive (IA=4.03, EA=4.72) and pro-social (IA=4.05, EA=4.81) silence as expected.  This 
is confirmed with paired sample t-tests in Panel B of Table 10.  Given individuals are given 
the chance to share information, I do not expect them to be concerned about not being heard.  
Comparing the means across Auditor Type, I find that defensive and pro-social silence are 
both considered more of a reason not to share the information with the external auditor 
compared to the internal auditor (defensive: t=1.560, p=0.061; pro-social: t=1.819, p=0.034).  
This provides some support that individuals are more concerned with sharing information 
outside their organization than inside their organization, due to both repercussions and the 
fear of hurting their organization. 
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TABLE 10 
Descriptive Statistics for Silence Measures [n = 85] 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics – Reason for Silence 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
(std. dev.) 
n 
Auditor Type 
 Internal External Overall 
Type of Silence 
 
Acquiescent 
2.42 
(1.68) 
38 
2.72 
(1.96) 
47 
2.59 
(1.82) 
85 
Defensive 
4.03 
(2.03) 
38 
4.72 
(2.04) 
47 
4.41 
(2.05) 
85 
Pro-social 
4.05 
(1.86) 
38 
4.81 
(1.94) 
47 
4.47 
(1.93) 
85 
 
Panel B: Paired Sample t-tests for Silence    
Pairs 
 
Error t df 
p-value 
(two-tailed) 
Acquiescent vs Defensive 0.268 6.807 84 <0.001 
Acquiescent vs Pro-social 0.281 6.704 84 <0.001 
Defensive vs Pro-social 0.211 0.279 84 0.781 
 
Panel C: Paired Sample t-tests for Auditor Type  
 
Pairs 
 
Error t df 
p-value 
(two-tailed) 
Defensive     
Internal vs External Auditor 0.444 1.569 83 0.061 
Pro-social     
Internal vs External Auditor 0.756 1.819 83 0.034 
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Table 10 continued 
 
Panel D: Main Repeated Measure Mixed Model for LTS with Silence Measures Added 
 
Effect 
Mean 
Squares F df 
p-value 
(two-tailed) 
Within:     
Severity 19.752 8.622 1 0.004 
Severity*Auditor Type 7.780 3.396 1 0.067 
Severity*Pro-social  11.267 4.918 1 0.028 
Error 2.291  166  
     
Between:     
Auditor Type 16.569 2.725 1 0.101 
Defensive  2.950 0.485 1 0.460 
Pro-social  73.855 12.146 1 0.001 
Error 6.081  166  
     
 
Notes: 
LTS is the participants’ likelihood to share weaknesses rated on a scale of 1 = very unlikely to share 
through 7 = very likely to share.  
 
Auditor type External auditor means participants were to assume they were providing information to 
an external auditor and Internal Auditor means participants were told they were providing information 
to the internal auditor. 
 
Severity has 2 levels; IC 1 and IC2 (High), and IC 5 and IC 6 (Low). 
 
Silence is measured using three questions asking the reason for not sharing IC weaknesses.  These 
questions are based on the three different types of silence defined by Van Dyne et al. (2003); 
acquiescent, defensive and pro-social.  Please refer to Appendix A for specific questions. 
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 Based on prior results in the organizational silence literature, I measured participant's 
degree of comfort in sharing the internal control weaknesses (CTS) as a potential process 
measure. Comfort to share (CTS) is measured on a 7-point Likert scale with 1 = Not very 
comfortable sharing the information and 7 = Very comfortable sharing the information using 
the following question: “How comfortable would you be to share this information during the 
interview with the auditor?”  This variable is measured because prior research has shown that 
the unwillingness to share negative information can be due to the discomfort in being the one 
to share that information (Van Dyne et al., 2003; Morrison and Milliken, 2000).  Overall, I 
find that LTS for each internal control weakness is positively and significantly correlated with 
the corresponding CTS score. Also when running the main model (with and without silence 
variables included) with CTS instead of LTS as the dependent variable, I obtain similar 
results. This provides some support that an individuals’ comfort level is associated with how 
willing they are to share information.   
4.2.7 Supplemental Analysis 
To confirm that silence is driving the interaction, as I predict, I include two measures 
of silence in the model (defensive and pro-social silence) presented in Table 10, Panel D.  I 
find that defensive silence is not significant (F=0.485, p=0.460), but pro-social silence is 
significant (F=12.146, p=0.001).  Also, when the measures of silence are included in the 
model, the original interaction of severity and identity becomes marginally significant 
(F=3.396, p=0.067), while the interaction of pro-social silence and severity is highly 
significant (F=4.918, p=0.028).  Therefore, this provides support that silence is at least 
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partially driving the difference in information sharing between the two groups as severity 
increases.  
Although a post hoc analysis focusing on the difference between high and low severity 
within IAs was only found to be marginally significant, the difference in means was not in the 
direction expected.  Based on the means, individuals would share more high severity 
information than low severity information with the internal auditor.  To understand this I 
focus on the qualitative responses that were provided.  Individuals were asked after stating 
their likelihood to share the internal control weakness to “please state the reason for level of 
willingness to share the weakness.” 
 For high severity items, the participants in the internal auditor condition stated their 
main reasons for sharing the information are to “keep the company safe” or to “protect the 
company”, whereas for those in the external auditor condition, the main reasons not to share 
the information is “it reflects poorly on the company” or “it will impact the audit”.  Both 
groups seem to want to protect their organization, but when interviewed by an internal 
auditor, individuals see sharing the information as a way to protect their organization.  When 
interviewed by an external auditor, withholding the information is seen as a way to protect the 
organization.  These comments indicate that silence, particularly pro-social silence, is more 
likely to be invoked when employees are interviewed by EAs than by IAs.  When interviewed 
by an IA, employee’s voice seems to be invoked.  As I did not focus on voice in this research 
I cannot confirm this and will leave this to be examined in future research. 
 For the low severity weaknesses, participants in both Auditor Type conditions 
indicated their main reasons for not sharing the information were because they were “not a big 
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deal” or only a “minor issue.” Participants in the external auditor condition also stated they 
would not share the information because it “may make the company look bad if known”, thus 
they are withholding information to protect the company.  
 These statements provide some support for silence being the process by which I find a 
difference in information being shared between internal and external auditors.  When 
interviewed by external auditors, individuals appear to be trying to protect the company via 
pro-social silence, no matter the severity level of the information.  When interviewed by an 
internal auditor, individuals are again trying to protect the company, but are doing so by 
sharing the more severe information in an attempt to improve the company' system of internal 
control. 
 Overall, I find support for both H1 and H2.  Employees share more information with 
internal auditors than external auditors, as predicted by social identity theory.  Also, as the 
severity of the information increases, the difference in information shared between IA and EA 
increases, as predicted by both the social identity and silence literatures.  In the following 
chapter, I focus on whether the IA can objectively assess this information once obtained and 
whether the EA will rely on the IA’s work.   
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Chapter 5 
Study Two 
5.1 Experimental Method 
 Study two focuses on my second research question; will the IA be able to objectively 
assess internal control weaknesses so that the EA can be confident in relying on the IA’s 
work?  Specifically, I make three separate predictions that are tested in Study two.  
Hypothesis 3 predicts that IAs with strong organizational identity (OI) will assess internal 
control weaknesses less severely than IAs with weak OI (H3a) and less severely than EAs 
(H3b).  Hypothesis 4 predicts that the salience of the IA’s professional norms will matter. 
Specifically, when IA professional norms are salient, the difference in assessment of internal 
control weaknesses of IAs with strong OI and IAs with weak OI will be smaller (H4a) than 
when professional norms are not salient. The same prediction is also made when comparing 
the difference in assessment of internal control weaknesses between IAs with strong OI and 
EAs (H4b).  Finally Hypothesis 5 predicts that when EAs are aware the IA adheres to a set of 
professional norms, the EAs will be more willing to rely on the IAs work than when the EAs 
are not aware of this fact.  Below I describe the participants, the experimental design and 
related results.    
5.1.1 Participants 
 The participants for Study two are a larger group of IAs and a smaller group of EAs. 
IAs were recruited through the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) in New York State and the 
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province of Ontario.22  Of the 101 IAs that started the online experiment, 83 completed it. IAs 
and EAs were recruited through CPA chapters the states of New York and Pennsylvania.  Of 
the 41 EAs that started the online experiment, 34 completed it.  As individuals volunteered to 
participate in the study, they were sent an email with the link to the online experiment.  
Demographic information was collected from both groups to ensure appropriate experience 
with internal control assessments and to control for experience, professional certification, 
education, sex, age, or specific firm effects. Participants volunteered to participate and were 
entered into a draw for five $100 restaurant gift cards for completing the study. 
5.1.2 Experimental Design and Procedures 
Study two includes a 2 (organizational identity strong/weak) X 2 (professional norms 
salient/non-salient) between subjects design using the IA participants to test H3a and H4a. 
The dependent variable in these tests is the IA’s evaluation of the severity of the four internal 
control weaknesses identified in Study one. The group of EA participants also evaluates the 
severity of the same four IC weaknesses and their evaluations are compared with those of the 
IA group to test H3b and H4b. Finally, the EA group is subject to a 2x1 between subjects 
manipulation in which half of the group is informed that the IA adheres to a professional code 
of ethics while the other half is not informed of this fact. The EAs then provide an estimate of 
their willingness to rely on the IAs evaluation of the severity of the IC weaknesses to test H5. 
 
                                                     
22 The number of participants needed was determined using the statistical software G-power.  Based on a similar 
study (SHC, 2012) a small effect size was assumed and 95% significance required.  
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Experimental Procedures for Internal Auditor Participants 
A flowchart of experimental procedures for the IA participants is presented in Figure 3 
(Panel A) and a copy of the experimental instrument is provided in Appendix B. The 
experiment proceeds as follows. First, the IA is asked to read either the IIA code of ethics 
(professional norms salient) or an unrelated news article (professional norms non-salient).23  
The participants are asked to answer specific questions to ensure they actually read the code 
or related news article. Those receiving the code of ethics are also asked to compare the code 
to their own department’s or professional designation’s code of ethics and are asked to 
confirm that they adhere to this or a similar code.   
Recall that social identity theory indicates organizational identity must be both strong 
and salient for identity to have an effect on judgment. Therefore, I first ensure that 
organizational identity is salient in the IA participant group by asking them to provide three 
reasons why their current employer is a quality organization to work for, similar to the salient 
manipulation used in Bauer (2011).  I then measure the IA’s organizational identity with their 
employer using a modified version of Mael and Ashforth’s (1992) six question scale (also 
used in Study one).  This measure is used to ensure that organizational identity is salient and 
also as a potential control for any differences in the organizational identity brought to the 
experiment by the IAs in the sample.   
                                                     
23 I have some confidence in the efficacy of this manipulation based on Davidson and Stevens (2013), Mazar et 
al., (2008) and Bauer (2011) who all successfully manipulated group social norms salience using similar 
manipulations. 
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Next, organizational identity strength is manipulated within IAs. The manipulation 
involves the IA participant being asked to assume they are assessing internal control 
weaknesses for their own employing organization (strong organizational identity) or for a 
different organization, XYZ, Inc. (weak organizational identity). To create a weak identity 
with XYZ, Inc., the IAs are asked to imagine that XYZ, Inc. is a company that  their 
organization has recently acquired and they are relatively unfamiliar with it at the time of the 
internal control assessment.  
 At this point, all of the IAs are asked to imagine they have conducted a series of 
interviews with employees and have identified four internal control weaknesses (same as 
those used in Study one, see Table 6). They are then asked to identify if each weakness should 
be consider a material weakness, a significant deficiency or neither and to assess the severity 
of each weakness on a 7-point scale. Finally, they complete manipulation check and 
demographic questions in a post-experimental questionnaire. 
 
Experimental Procedures for External Auditor Participants 
 A flowchart of experimental procedures for the EA participants is presented in Figure 
3 (Panel B) and a copy of the experimental instrument is provided in Appendix B. First, half 
of the EA participants are informed that the IA adheres to a code of ethics and are presented 
with the IIA code of ethics which they are asked to read carefully. The other half of the EA 
participants are provided with an unrelated news article which they are asked to read 
carefully. Both groups are then asked to answer some questions about what they have read to 
ensure they have paid attention to the material presented to them.  
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Next, all of the EAs are asked to imagine they are conducting an internal control 
assessment at one of their clients, XYZ, Inc.  They are given additional information about the 
client’s internal audit function including that the IAs working for XYZ’s parent company are 
competent, have done work of high quality and their work has been relied upon in previous 
audits. The EAs learn there is pressure to reduce audit fees while maintaining a high quality 
audit. 
 At this point, all of the EAs are asked to imagine they have conducted a series of 
interviews with employees and have identified four internal control weaknesses (as used in 
Study one, see Table 6). They are then asked to identify if each weakness should be consider a 
material weakness, a significant deficiency or neither and to assess the severity of each 
weakness. Next the EAs are asked how willing they would have been to rely on a control 
assessment performed by XYZ’s IA based on their knowledge of the organization’s IA 
function (on a seven-point scale). Finally, the EAs answer a manipulation check question, as 
well as other demographic and comprehension questions.  
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FIGURE 3 
Experimental Procedures  
 
 Panel A: Internal Auditor Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manipulation Checks: 
1. Organizational Identity 
2. Professional Norms Salience 
Demographics 
Dependent Variables: 
1. Assessment of IC Weaknesses as Material Weaknesses, Deficiencies or Neither 
2. Measurement of Severity of IC Weaknesses (test of H3a and H4a) 
Organizational Identity Weak:  
 Assess IC 
Weaknesses of Newly 
 Acquired Organization 
 
 Organizational Identity Strong: 
 Assess IC Weaknesses of Own 
Organization 
Professional Norm Salient: 
1. IIA Code of Ethics Provided  
2. Questions Related to Code 
Provided List of 4 Known IC Weaknesses  
Professional Norm Non Salient: 
1. Unrelated News Article Provided  
2. Questions Related to Article 
Prime Organizational Identity Salience: 
1. List 3 Qualities of Own Organization 
2. Measure Current Level of Organizational Identity (Covariate) 
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Figure 3 continued 
 
Panel B: External Auditors Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Dependent Variables: 
1. Severity of IC Weaknesses (test of H3b and H4b) 
2. Willingness to Rely on Internal Auditor’s Work (test of H5) 
Manipulation Check: 
Aware of IA’s Professional Norms or Not 
Demographics 
Aware of IA’s Professional Norms  
1. IIA Code of Ethics Provided  
2. Questions Related to Code 
Unaware of IA’s Professional Norms: 
1. Unrelated Article Provided  
2. Questions Related to Article 
Provided Scenario:  
1. Provided Information about Internal Auditor Competence and Work Performance 
2. Must consider whether to rely on the IA’s IC assessment 
Provided List of 4 Known IC Weaknesses identified by IA  
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5.1.3 Independent Variables 
Organizational Identity Strength of Internal Auditors 
 To manipulate organizational identity strength (OI) in the IA participant group, I vary 
information about the organization in which the IA is expected to assess the internal control 
weaknesses.  They are asked to imagine that during interviews with employees, four internal 
control weaknesses were identified and their task is to assess the severity of each weakness.  
Participants in the strong OI condition assess the internal controls of their own organization.  
Participants in the weak OI condition assess the internal controls of XYZ, Inc., a company 
that has been recently acquired and is relatively unfamiliar to them.  
 
IA Professional Norms Salience 
Internal auditor participants in the IA professional norms salient condition receive the 
IIA code of ethics and are asked to read it, compare it to their own code, and state that they 
adhere to this or a similar code.  Internal auditor participants in the IA professional norms 
non-salient condition receive an unrelated news article and are asked to read it and answer 
some questions about what they have read. The excerpt from the IIA Code of Ethics and the 
news article assigned are provided in Appendix B.    
 
EA Professional Norm Awareness 
Half of the EAs are informed that the IAs working for their audit client adhere to the 
IIA code of ethics and are provided with a copy of the code. The other half are told nothing 
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about a code of ethics and instead read an unrelated news article. Both groups answer 
questions about the content they have read to ensure they comprehend it and have spent time 
carefully reading it. 
5.1.4 Dependent Variables 
Severity of Internal Control Weaknesses 
 Similar to Gramling et al. (2012), I use two questions to measure the internal and 
external auditors’ assessments of the severity of the internal control weaknesses.  The first 
question asks “Please select whether you believe this internal control concern to be a material 
weakness, significant deficiency or neither.”  This question is asked because it is similar to a 
decision auditors would have to make in practice.  The second question asks the auditor to 
“Please rate the internal control concern based on your opinion of the overall level of 
severity” on a scale of 1 to 7 where 1 = low severity and 7 = high severity. 
 
Willingness to Rely on Internal Auditor Assessment 
I use a modified version of the question used by Glover et al. (2008), in which they 
ask EA participants to indicate to what extent their audit firm would rely on work already 
performed by IAs. I modify this question to ask “to what extent would you have been willing 
to rely on a previously performed internal auditor assessment of the severity of these 
concerns?”  I use a 7 point Likert scale, which is anchored at “not willing to rely” (1) and 
“very willing to rely” (7)  
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Usefulness of Internal Control Assessment 
I also ask the EAs how useful having the IAs internal control assessment would have 
been when conducting their own assessment.  I use a 7 point Likert scale, which is anchored 
at “not useful” (1) and “very useful” (7). 
5.1.5 Manipulation Checks and Control Variables 
 To assess my manipulation of organizational identity strength, I use a modified 
version of the Inclusion of Others in Self Scale (Aron et al., 2004). This scale provides the 
participant with seven images of two overlapping circles, 'self' and 'organization (XYZ, Inc.)' 
depending on condition. These images range from no overlap (weak identity) to almost 
complete overlap (high identity).  
To assess my manipulation of professional norms salience for IAs, I use a measure 
from Bauer (2011).  Participants are asked “To what extent has the information in this 
experiment made you think about the accounting profession and the values, attributes, and 
qualities you possess as a member of this profession”.  I use a 7-point Likert scale anchored at 
“Gave it little thought” (1) and “Gave it much thought” (7). 
To assess my manipulation of EA awareness of the IA’s professional norms, I use the 
following question; “Based on the information in this experiment, please rate how objective 
you perceive the internal auditor to be”. Again, responses are collected on a 7-point Likert 
scale anchored at “Not very objective” (1) and “Highly objective” (7).  I design this question 
to capture the EA’s perception of the IA’s objectivity because making salient the IA’s 
professional norms to the EA is expected to make the EA see the IA as being more objective.  
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I control for the EA’s past perception of IA’s objectivity by asking the following 
question; “Please rate how objective you typically perceive the internal auditors to be”, 
anchored at “Not very objective” (1) and “Highly objective” (7). (Referred to as Past 
Perception).  Finally, I control for the IA participants’ pre-existing level of organizational 
identity using the modified six question identity scale from Mael and Ashforth (1992) as used 
in Study one.       
5.2 Results 
5.2.1 Participants 
 Demographics for all IA participants in Study two are presented in Table 11. More 
than 50 percent of participants in this group are over 40 years of age and all are at least 20 
years of age.  Ninety percent of participants have at least 4 years work experience and 85 
percent have at least 4 years of internal audit work experience.  Results also indicate that 48 
percent are male and 85 percent have participated in an internal control assessment in the past.   
 Overall, I find no significant differences on demographics between experimental 
conditions (all p > 0.100). However, to the extent that these characteristics may have effects 
across all conditions, I do run all main hypothesis tests with the above variables as controls, 
but none are significant.  Also, none of these variables are correlated with the dependent 
variables.   
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TABLE 11 
Internal Auditor Demographics [n = 83] 
 
 
 Range: # % Cumulative % 
Experience: 
1-3 8 9.8 9.8 
4-6 15 18.3 28 
7-9 14 17.1 45.1 
10+ 45 54.9 100 
     
IA Experience: 
1-3 11 13.4 13.4 
4-6 17 20.7 34.1 
7-9 15 18.3 52.4 
10+ 39 47.6 100 
     
Sex: 
Male 38 45.8  
Female 41 51.9  
     
Age: 
20-30 20 24.7 24.7 
31-40 19 23.5 48.1 
41-50 26 32.1 80.2 
>50 16 19.8 100 
     
Experience with IC 
Assessment: 
Yes 70 85.4  
No 12 14.6  
     
Accounting 
Designation: 
Yes 56 67.5  
No 27 32.5  
     
Education: 
Undergrad 49 59.7 59.7 
Graduate 33 60.3 100 
PhD 0 0  
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 Demographics for all EA participants in Study two are presented in Table 12. In the 
EA respondent group, more than 35 percent are over 30 years of age and all are at least 20 
years of age. Seventy percent of participants have at least 4 years work experience and 91 
percent have no internal audit work experience.  Also, 78 percent are male and 82 percent 
have participated in an internal control assessment in the past.   
TABLE 12  
External Auditor Demographics [n = 34] 
 
 Range: # % Cumulative % 
Experience: 
1-3 10 30.3 30.3 
4-6 10 30.3 60.6 
7-9 6 18.2 78.8 
10+ 7 21.2 100 
     
 
IA Experience: 
0 31 90.9 90.9 
1-3 3 9.1 100 
4-6 0 0 100 
7-9 0 0 100 
 10+ 0 0 100 
     
Sex: 
Male 26 78.8  
Female 7 21.2  
     
Age: 
20-30 21 63.6 63.6 
31-40 8 24.2 87.9 
41-50 4 12.1 100 
>50 0 0 100 
     
Involvement with 
IC Assessment: 
Yes 27 81.8  
No 6 18.2  
     
Accounting 
Designation: 
Yes 29 87.9  
No 4 12.1  
     
Education: 
Undergrad 14 42.4 42.4 
Graduate 19 57.6 100 
PhD 0 0  
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 T-tests indicate marginally significant differences in years of experience (t = 1.869, p 
= 0.071) and involvement with prior internal control assessments (t=1.752, p=0.09) across 
conditions, as well as a significant difference on accounting designation across conditions 
(t=2.307, p=0.028).  Age, sex, education and IA experience do not vary significantly between 
IA Professional Norms Awareness conditions (all p > 0.100). To the extent any of these 
characteristics have effects across the conditions, I do run all main hypothesis tests with the 
above variables as controls, but none are significant.  Also, none of these variables are 
correlated with the dependent variable. 
5.2.2 Manipulation Checks 
Internal Auditor Sample 
All IAs are initially asked a comprehension check question to ensure they understand 
whether they are assessing internal control weaknesses discovered in their own organization 
(IA strong OI) or XYZ, Inc., a recently acquired subsidiary (IA weak OI). All IAs answered 
this question correctly before they rated the severity of the weaknesses provided to them.  
To assess my manipulation of organizational identity strength, I use a modified 
version of the Inclusion of Others in Self Scale (Aron et al., 2004).  This scale includes seven 
representations of the auditor and the organization as two circles with varying degrees of 
overlap from no overlap (scored as 1) to almost complete overlap (scored as 7). The 
participants are asked to choose the degree of overlap that best represents how they feel about 
the alignment of their personal attributes, qualities and values with those of the organization. I 
find that there is a marginally significant difference between the mean score of the two groups 
of IAs (F=1.608, p=0.104).  While I had hoped to achieve a stronger effect, this marginally 
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significant difference will only limit my ability to find a differences in internal control 
assessments between the IA groups.  Results can be found in Table 13. 
TABLE 13 
Internal Auditor Organizational Identity Strength Manipulation Check [n=83] 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
 
Panel B: One way ANOVA of Auditor Organizational Strength  
 
Source df F p-value 
Auditor OI 1 1.608 0.104 
Total 82   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: 
Organizational identity strength is measured using a modified version of the Inclusion of Others in 
Self Scale (Aron et al., 2004) that uses a scale of 1 = weak identity and 7 = strong identity.   
 
Auditor OI Manipulation: OI Strong when assessing weaknesses in own company and OI Weak 
when assessing weaknesses in newly acquired subsidiary.  
 
p-value is one tailed because hypotheses are directional. 
 
 
To assess my manipulation of professional norms salience for IAs, I use a measure 
from Bauer (2011).  Participants are asked “To what extent has the information in this 
experiment made you think about the accounting profession and the values, attributes, and 
qualities you possess as a member of this profession”.  I use a 7-point Likert scale anchored at 
Mean 
(std. dev.) 
n 
Auditor Organizational Identity Strength 
OI Strong OI Weak Overall 
 Identity with the Organization 
4.643 
(1.162) 
43 
4.308 
(1.245) 
40 
4.482 
(1.217) 
83 
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“Gave it little thought” (1) and “Gave it much thought” (7).  I find that there is a significant 
difference between the two groups (F=3.497, p=0.032).  Results can be found in table 14. 
 
TABLE 14 
Internal Auditor Professional Norms Salience Manipulation Check [n=83] 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
 
Panel B: One way ANOVA of Professional Norms Salience  
 
Source df F p-value 
Professional Norms Salience 1 3.497 0.032 
Total 82   
 
Note: 
Professional Norms Salience measured by asking on a 7 point scale, “To what extent has the 
information in this experiment made you think about the accounting profession and the values, 
attributes, and qualities you possess as a member of this profession”.   
 
p-value is one tailed because hypotheses are directional. 
 
 
External Auditor Sample 
All EAs are initially asked a comprehension check question to ensure they understand 
they are auditing an existing client.  All EAs answered this question correctly before they 
rated the severity of the information provided to them. 
Mean 
(std. dev.) 
n 
Professional Norms Salience 
Salient Non-Salient Overall 
Salience of “... the values, 
attributes, and qualities you 
possess as a member of this 
profession” 
5.450 
(1.319) 
43 
4.907 
(1.324) 
40 
5.169 
(1.342) 
83 
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To assess my manipulation of EA awareness that the IA adheres to a set of 
professional norms, I use the following question; “Based on the information in this 
experiment, please rate how objective you perceive the internal auditor to be?” on a scale of 1 
= Not very objective to 7 = strongly objective. I find that there is a significant difference 
between conditions, while controlling for EAs past perception of IA objectivity (F=6.814, 
p=0.014; Past perception F=1.807, p=0.189). This result shows that the EA’s perception of the 
objectivity of the IAs internal control assessment in this sample is significantly higher when 
the EA is aware that the IA adheres to the IIA code of ethics (i.e., the IA’s professional 
identity is made salient to the EA), as expected. See Table 15 for results. 
To control for the EAs level of past willingness to rely on IAs’ work, I also ask 
“Please rate the degree to which you personally typically rely on your client’s internal audit 
work” on a scale of 1 = Not Very likely to 7 = Highly likely (denoted in tables as Prior Rely).  
Running a one way ANOVA with Prior Rely as the dependent variable, I find that there is a 
significant difference between conditions (F=10.073, p=0.003), summarized in Table 15, 
panel B.  Given its statistical significance, I include Prior Rely as a covariate when testing H5.   
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TABLE 15 
EA Manipulation Checks and Covariates 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
 
Panel B: ANOVA for EA Awareness of IA Professional Norms [n=33] 
Effect 
Mean 
Squares F df 
p-value 
(two-tailed) 
     
Perceived Objectivity 7.352 6.814 1 0.014 
Covariate: 
Past Perception of typical IA 
objectivity 
 
1.950 
 
1.807 
1  
0.189 
Error 1.079  30  
     
Panel C: ANOVA for Prior rely  
Source df F p-value 
IA Professional Norm Salience 1 10.073 0.003 
Total 32   
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: 
Awareness of IA Professional Norms manipulation – Aware when EA knows the IA adheres to IIA 
code of ethics and reads its contents and not aware when EA reads an unrelated news article and no 
mention is made of IIA code of ethics or other professional norms.  
 
Perceived objectivity is the EA’s perception of the objectivity of the IA described in the scenario.  
 
Past Perception of Typical IA Objectivity is the EA’s perception of the objectivity of the typical IA 
previously encountered in practice. 
 
Prior rely is the EA’s typical willingness to rely on an IA’s internal control assessment. 
Scale anchors are 1 = low degree of perceived objectivity or reliance and 7 = high degree of perceived 
objectivity or reliance. 
Mean 
(std. dev.) 
n 
EA Awareness of IA Professional Norms 
Aware Unaware Overall 
How objective you perceive the 
internal auditor to be?  
4.813 
(1.276) 
16 
3.647 
(0.785) 
17 
4.212 
(1.192) 
33 
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5.2.3 Descriptive Statistics for Internal and External Auditor Samples  
 The descriptive statistics for the IA sample are reported in Table 16. Because I 
intentionally construct each IC weakness to have a different severity level, I mean center each 
IC weakness based on each ICs overall severity rating.  This allows me to eliminate the 
difference found in severity between each IC and focus on the difference found between 
auditor types.  Therefore, a positive mean indicates a more severe rating than the overall mean 
and a negative mean indicates a less severe rating than the overall mean of the IC.  Also I treat 
the four IC ratings for each participant as four items on a scale.  Therefore, my dependent 
variable is constructed as a repeated measure of the four IC ratings within each condition and 
I refer to it as Severity. Again, this is done for Study two because unlike in Study one, I am 
interested in the overall difference in severity assessments between auditor types, rather than 
the specific differences found in assessments between the four different ICs and depending on 
auditor type.  A graphical representation of the centered means is found in Figure 4. Table 16 
reports the overall centered means and standard deviations for each condition.24   
  
                                                     
24 For simplicity purposes, I report, both in figure 4 and table 16, the overall centered means for all four ICs 
combined.  I also ran overall model using the overall centered means and found similar results to mixed model 
used in the results section. 
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FIGURE 4 
Mean-Centered Means for Severity of Internal Contral Weaknesses 
 by Experimental Condition  
 
 
 
Notes:  
Severity is the overall mean-centered mean severity rating of the 4 identified internal control 
weaknesses (initially rated on a scale of 1 = low severity to 7 = high severity). By construction, a 
positive value indicates a more severe rating than a negative value. 
 
Internal Auditor OI is strong for internal auditors auditing their own organization and weak for 
internal auditors auditing a newly acquired division. 
 
Professional Norm Salience is salient when the IA reads the IIA code of ethics and non-salient when 
the IA reads an unrelated news article and no reference is made to the code of ethics.  EA’s 
professional norms not manipulated. 
 
Centered means created by first calculating the overall mean severity rating for each IC and then 
subtracting it from the mean severity rating for each IC. Next, the mean of the four centered ICs means 
is taken for each condition. 
 
 
  
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Salient All Eas Non Salient
IA Strong OI
IA Weak OI
All EAs
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TABLE 16 
Descriptive Statistics for Assessed Severity of Internal Control Weaknesses for  
 Internal and External Auditor Samples  
 
 
 
Notes: 
Centered means created by first calculating the overall mean severity rating for each IC and then 
subtracting it from the mean severity rating for each IC. Next, the mean of the four centered ICs means 
is taken for each condition. 
 
Severity is the overall mean-centered mean severity rating of the 4 identified internal control 
weaknesses (initially rated on a scale of 1 = low severity to 7 = high severity). By construction, a 
positive value indicates a more severe rating than a negative value. 
 
Internal Auditor OI is strong for internal auditors auditing their own organization and weak for 
internal auditors auditing a newly acquired division.  
 
Professional Norm Salience for Internal auditors is salient when the IA reads the IIA code of ethics 
and non-salient when the IA reads an unrelated news article and no reference is made to the code of 
ethics. 
 
External auditors professional norm awareness means the EA is aware that the IA adheres to the IIA 
code of conduct while non-salient means the EA unaware and no reference is made to the code of 
ethics. 
 
 
 
 
 Centered mean 
(std. dev.) 
n 
Auditor Group 
 Internal Auditor  
 Strong OI Weak OI Overall EA 
Professional 
Norm 
Salience  
Salient 
0.329 
(0.502) 
22 
-0.076 
(0.851) 
23 
0.122 
(0.724) 
45 
0.062 
(0.715) 
16 
Non-Salient 
-0.274 
(0.817) 
21 
0.029 
(0.739) 
17 
-0.138 
(0.788) 
38 
-0.069 
(0.628) 
18 
Overall 
0.034 
(0.733) 
43 
-0.313 
(0.797) 
40 
0.003 
(0.761) 
83 
-0.007 
(0.664) 
34 
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5.2.4 Hypotheses Testing 
Hypotheses 3a and 4a focus on how IAs with different levels of organizational identity 
strength will differ in their ratings of the severity of internal control weaknesses, while 
hypotheses 3b and 4b focus on how IAs with a strong organizational identity and EAs will 
differ in their ratings of the severity of internal control weaknesses.  To test these four 
hypotheses, I will first focus on the comparison of the IAs (strong OI vs. weak OI) and then 
focus on the comparison of IAs with strong organizational identity and the EA group.   
To analyze hypotheses 3a and 4a, I start by running a repeated measure mixed model 
with Severity, measured as the centered mean severity ratings for each of the four ICs, as the 
repeated dependent variable, and Professional Norm Salience (Salient/Non-Salient) and 
Internal Auditor OI (Strong/Weak) as the independent variables. I find a significant 
interaction of Internal Auditor OI and Professional Norm Salience (F=8.674, p=0.002). This 
Model is found in Table 17, panel A. 
In Hypothesis 3a, I predict that IAs will assess internal control weaknesses less 
severely when their organizational identity is strong rather than weak. Therefore, to test H3a I 
focus on the main effect of Auditor OI within the model, which is not significant (F=0.141, 
p=0.355).  This does not provide support for H3a.   
Hypothesis 4a predicts that salient professional norms will attenuate the difference in 
assessment of internal control weaknesses of IAs with strong and weak organizational 
identities. In other words, I predict that by introducing salient professional norms, internal 
auditors with strong OI will make judgments of the severity of internal control weaknesses 
more like internal auditors with weak OI.  To test H4a, I use contrast coding (3, -1,-1,-1) to 
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compare the mean severity ratings in the Strong OI/ Non-Salient norms cell to the mean 
severity ratings in the Strong OI/Salient norms cell, the Weak OI/Salient norms cell, and the 
Weak OI/Non-Salient norms cell.  As presented in Table 17, panel B, the difference contrast 
coded test is significant (t=-2.649, p=0.004).  This provides support for H4a. 
As H3a and H4a combine to predict a significant interaction, which was found, 
follow-up investigation is required to understand the form of that interaction.25 I use planned 
comparisons, first to compare the Strong OI/Non-salient norms cell to the Weak OI/Non-
salient norms cell.  I find a marginally significant difference in Auditor OI (t=1.741, p=0.042) 
indicating when OI is strong, internal auditors rate internal control weaknesses less severe 
than when their OI is weak.   This provides some support for H3a. See Table 17 panel C for 
results.  Next I compare the difference in severity ratings between Strong OI/Salient norms 
cell to the Weak OI/Salient norms cell and find it to be significant (t=2.461, p=0.007). 
 Therefore, the planned comparison results provide some support that the interaction is 
disordinal, not ordinal as predicted, and highlight that making professional norms salient 
actually causes internal auditors with strong OI to assess internal control weaknesses more 
severely than those with weak OI.  
 
 
  
                                                     
25 It is important to understand the form of the interaction as a disordinal interaction can mask the main effect of 
the independent variables (Aiken and West, 1991). 
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 TABLE 17 
Hypothesis Testing for H3a and H4a [n = 83] 
 
Panel A: Repeated Measure Mixed Model of Severity of Internal Control Assessment  
 
Effect 
Mean 
Square F df 
p-value 
(one-tailed) 
     
Professional Norm Salience  
Auditor OI 
Professional Norm Salience*Auditor OI 
5.075 
0.215 
10.287 
3.921 
0.141 
8.674 
1 
1 
1 
0.025 
0.355 
0.002 
Error     1.561  328  
 
Panel B: Contrast coding for H4a 
   
Effect t df 
p-value 
(one-tailed) 
Coding (-3, 1, 1, 1) 
-3: Strong OI/Non-Salient  
1: Strong OI/Salient 
1: Weak OI/ Non-Salient 
1: Weak OI/ Salient 
2.649 328 0.004 
 
 
Panel C: Planned Comparisons to investigate interaction 
   
Effect t df 
p-value 
(one-tailed) 
H3a Non-Salient Professional Norms:    
  Strong OI vs Weak OI -1.741 328 0.042 
H4a Salient Professional Norms:    
   Strong OI vs. Weak OI 2.467 328 0.007 
 
Notes: 
Severity is the overall mean-centered mean severity rating of the 4 identified internal control 
weaknesses (initially rated on a scale of 1 = low severity to 7 = high severity).  By construction, a 
positive value indicates a more severe rating than a negative value. 
 
Internal Auditor OI is strong for internal auditors auditing their own organization and weak for 
internal auditors auditing a newly acquired division. 
 
Professional Norm Salience is salient when the IA reads the IIA code of ethics and non-salient when 
the IA reads an unrelated news article and no reference is made to the code of ethics. 
 
p-values are one tailed because the hypotheses are both directional. 
 
Significance for planned comparisions adjusted to 0.025 using bonferroni method. 
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I now turn my focus to H3b and H4b, which compare how IAs with strong OI and 
EAs will differ in their severity rating of internal control weaknesses.  To analyze hypotheses 
3b and 4b, I again start by running a repeated measure Mixed Model with Severity (centered 
mean of four IC severity ratings) as the repeated dependent variable, and Professional Norm 
Salience (Salient/Non-Salient) and Auditor type (IA with strong OI versus EA) as the 
independent variables.   I find a main effect of Professional Norm Salience (F=7.962, 
p=.002), and a significant interaction of Auditor Type and Professional Norm Salience 
(F=3.526, p=0.033). This model is found in Table 18, Panel A.  
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TABLE 18 
Hypothesis Testing for H3b and H4b [n = 77] 
 
Panel A: Repeated Measure Mixed Model for Severity of Internal Control Assessment 
 
Effect 
Mean 
Square F df 
p-value 
(one-tailed) 
Between:     
Professional Norm Salience  
Auditor Type 
Professional Norm Salience*Auditor Type 
2.561 
0.019 
1.053 
7.962 
0.342 
3.526 
1 
1 
1 
0.002 
0.281 
0.033 
Error     0.453  304  
 
Panel B: Contrast coding for H4b 
   
Effect t df 
p-value 
(one-tailed) 
Coding (-2, 1, 1) 
-2: Strong OI/Non-Salient  
1: Strong OI/Salient 
1: All EAs 
2.871 305 0.002 
 
 
Panel C: Planned Comparisons to Examine Interaction 
 
   
Effect t df 
p-value 
(one-tailed) 
H3b Non-Salient:    
 IA with Strong OI vs EA -1.446 305 0.075 
H4b Salient:    
IA with Strong OI vs EA 2.467 305 0.007 
 
Notes: 
Severity is the overall mean-centered mean severity rating of the 4 identified internal control 
weaknesses (initially rated on a scale of 1 = low severity to 7 = high severity). By construction, a 
positive value indicates a more severe rating than a negative value. 
 
Internal Auditor OI is strong for internal auditors auditing their own organization.  
 
Professional Norm Salience is salient when the IA reads the IIA code of ethics and non-salient when 
the IA reads an unrelated news article and no reference is made to the code of ethics. 
 
p-values are one tailed because the hypotheses are both directional. 
 
n includes 43 IAs in the Strong OI codition and all 34 EAs. 
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In hypothesis 3b, I predict that IAs with strong organizational identity will assess 
internal control weaknesses less severely than an EA would.  Therefore, to test H3b I focus on 
the main effect of Auditor OI within the model, which is not found to be significant (F=0.342, 
p=0.281).  This does not provide support for H3a.   
Hypothesis 4b predicts that the difference in assessments of internal control 
weaknesses between internal auditors with a strong organizational identity and an EA will be 
attenuated when professional norms are made salient to the IA group. In other words, I predict 
that by introducing salient professional norms, internal auditors with strong OI will make 
judgments of the severity of internal control weaknesses more like EAs do. Therefore, to test 
H4b I run contrast coding (-2, 1, 1) to compare the mean severity ratings in the IA Strong 
OI/Non-salient norms cell to the mean severity ratings in the IA Strong OI/Salient norms cell 
and the entire EA sample.26  As presented in Table 18, panel B, the contrast coding test is 
significant (t=-2.871, p=0.002).  This provides support for H4b. 
 Again, H3b and H4b combine to predict a significant interaction, which I do find 
(F=3.526, p=0.033).  I again use planned comparisons to investigate the form of this 
interaction.  First, I compare the mean severity ratings in the IA Strong OI/Non-salient cell to 
the mean severity ratings provided by the EAs.  I find a marginally significant difference in 
mean severity ratings depending on Auditor Type (t=-1.448, p=0.075). This provides some 
support for H3b by indicating that IAs with strong OI assess IC weaknesses to be less severe 
                                                     
26 Half of the EA sample was made aware that the IAs adhered to professional norms and the other half was not. 
This manipulation was specifically used to test hypothesis 5 using the EAs’ reliance judgment as the dependent 
variable, not the severity ratings of ICS.  In tests of H3b and H4b, I collapse the EAs across these conditions.  A 
t-test confirms that there is no significant difference in IC severity ratings depending on EA awareness that IA 
adheres to professional norms (t=0.151, p=0.571). 
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than would an EA. Results are presented in Table 18, panel C.  
.  Next, I compare the mean severity ratings in the IA Strong OI/Salient cell to the 
mean severity ratings provided by the EAs.  I find a significant difference in mean severity 
ratings depending on Auditor Type (t=2.467, p=0.007).  Therefore, the planned comparison 
results provide some support for a disordinal interaction, instead of the predicted ordinal 
interaction.  In other words, when professional norms are non-salient internal auditors with 
strong OI assess internal controls less severely than EAs, but when professional norms are 
salient internal auditors with strong OI actually assess internal control weaknesses more 
severely than EAs would. Results are presented in Table 18, panel C. 
In summary, I find marginal support for H3a and H4a, that an internal auditor will 
assess internal control weaknesses less severely when their organizational identity is strong 
rather than weak and less severely than an EA.  I also find strong support for H3b and H4b, 
that when professional norms are salient to the IA, any difference found in H3a and H4a is not 
only attenuated, but the IA will actually assess internal control weaknesses more severely 
when their organizational identity is strong rather than weak and more severely than an EA.  
Next I focus on hypothesis 5. 
The descriptive statistics for Hypothesis 5 are reported in Table 19, panel A.  In 
hypothesis 5, I predict that when the EA is aware that the IA adheres to strong professional 
norms (operationalized as adherence to the IIA code of ethics), the EA will be more willing to 
rely on the IA’s internal control assessment than when the EA is not aware of the IA’s strong 
professional norms.  Therefore, to test hypothesis 5, I focus within the EA participant group 
and compare those who are made aware that the IA has strong professional norms and those 
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who are not made aware. The main dependent variable of interest is the EA’s willingness to 
rely on the IAs work (1 = not willing to rely to 7 = very willing to rely).  Therefore to test H5, 
I run a Univariate ANOVA on Rely as the dependent variable and IA Professional Norm 
Salience as the independent variable.  As discussed in the control section, I did include Prior 
Rely as a covariate, but it is not significant so I do not include it in the final results.  I find 
Rely (F=8.38, p=0.003) to be significant. Results are reported in Table 19, panel B.  This 
result provides support for hypothesis 5.  When the EA is aware that the IA adheres to strong 
professional norms, the EA is more willing to rely on the IAs work as predicted.   
For additional analysis, I also collect EAs’ perceptions of the usefulness of the IA’s 
assessment when conducting their own assessment (1 = not very useful to 7 = very useful) and 
the degree of reliance (1= would not even read to 7 = would both read and fully rely).  I run a 
multivariate ANOVA on Usefulness and Level of Reliance as the dependent variables and IA 
Professional Norm Awareness as the independent variable.  I again included Prior Rely as a 
covariate, but again it is not significant and is left out of the final results. I find Level of 
Reliance to be significant (F=5.976, p=0.010), but Usefulness is not significant. Results are 
found in Table 19, panel C. 
 I also run a correlation test on Rely, Level of Reliance and Usefulness.  I find that Rely 
is significantly correlated with Level of Reliance and Usefulness, but not strongly (.397, and 
.421).  I also find that the overall mean of Usefulness is 5.50.  Since Usefulness is measured 
on a 7 point scale, I run a one-sample t-test to determine if the mean of 5.50 is statistically 
greater than the mid-point of the scale, which is 4.00 (neutral).  I find the mean of Usefulness 
is significantly greater than the scale mid-point (t=5.745, p<0.001). These correlations and the 
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significant mean of Usefulness provide additional support that although EAs typically find the 
IA to be useful, their level of reliance and their willingness to rely on the IA can be increased 
through the knowledge of the IA following a code of ethics.  Results are found in Table 19.  
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TABLE 19 
Tests of Hypothesis 5 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics – Rely, Usefulness, and Level of Reliance 
 
Mean 
(std. dev.) 
n Rely Usefulness Level of Reliance 
EA Aware of IA 
Strong 
Professional 
Norms 
4.938 
(1.12) 
16 
5.625 
(1.50) 
16 
4.688 
(0.60) 
16 
EA Unaware of IA 
Professional 
Norms 
3.833 
(1.09) 
18 
5.389 
(1.57) 
18 
4.000 
(0.97) 
18 
Total 
4.353 
(1.22) 
34 
5.50 
(1.52) 
34 
4.324 
(0.87) 
34 
 
 
Panel B: H5 Univariate ANOVA on Rely 
 
Effect 
Mean 
Squares F Df 
p-value 
(one-tailed) 
     
Rely 
Error 
10.32 
1.23 
8.38 1 
32 
0.003 
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Table 19 continued 
 
Panel C: Multivariate ANOVA on Usefulness, and Level of Reliance 
 
Effect 
Mean 
Squares F df 
p-value 
(one-tailed) 
     
Level of Reliance 
Error 
Usefulness 
4.00 
0.67 
0.47 
5.97 
 
0.19 
1 
32 
1 
0.010 
 
0.378 
Error 2.37  32  
 
Panel D: Correlation of Rely, Usefulness, and Level of Reliance 
 
(n=34) df Level of Reliance Usefulness  
Rely 1 0.397* 0.421*  
Level of Reliance 1  0.215  
 
Panel E: One Sample t-test with Usefulness as the Dependent Variable  
 
Source  df t p-value 
Usefulness 33 5.745 <0.001 
    
Notes: 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  Pearson Correlation test was used. 
 
Rely is the EA’s willingness to rely on this particular IA’s internal control assessment measured on a 7 
point scale where 1 = not willing to rely to 7 = very willing to rely. 
 
Usefulness is how useful the EA would have found this particular IA’s internal control assessment 
while doing their own assessment measured on a 7 point scale. 
 
Level of Reliance is the level in which the EA would rely on this particular IA’s internal control assessment 
measured on a 7 point scale where 1 = would not even read to 7 = would read and fully rely. 
 
EA Awareness of IA Professional Norms: EAs are either aware that the IA adheres to the IIA code of 
ethics or is unaware.  
 
p-values are one tailed because the hypothesis is directional. 
 
t-test used to compare mean of Usefulness to midpoint of scale at 4.  Scale is a 7 point scale. 
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Chapter 6 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 In this chapter I provide the concluding remarks on my thesis.  First, I discuss the 
main results, from Study one and two, and the implications from these results on the overall 
audit process.  Next, I discuss the limitations found within my thesis and any possibilities of 
future research that could come from these limitations.  Finally, I conclude with an overall 
conclusion to the thesis.   
6.1 Discussion of Results and Implications 
 In chapter 4, I analyze my results for Study one. Overall, I find support for Hypothesis 
1 and 2.  Together these findings provide evidence that IAs can obtain more information from 
employees than EAs, specifically when that information is more severe in nature.  In chapter 
5, I analyze my results for Study two.  I find some support for hypothesis 3a and 3b, but find 
strong support of hypothesis 4a, 4b and 5. Together Study two’s results provide some 
evidence that IAs may not be biased when assessing IC weaknesses, as some feared.  Also, a 
salient IA professional standard can help to ensure IA objectivity, even making them overly 
conservative, by ensuring IAs will assess IC weaknesses more severely than EA and that EAs, 
when aware of IA professional standards are more willing to rely on the IAs.  Next, I discuss 
the results from each study in detail, focusing on specific implications.  
6.1.1 Study One 
 Study one focuses on my first overall research question, which is, does the 
“employee” identity the IA assumes within the organization allow them the opportunity to 
discover more internal control weaknesses from their organization than an EA?  I predict, in 
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hypothesis one, that employees of an organization will be willing to share more information 
about internal control weaknesses with the IA than the EA.  This prediction is based on Social 
Identity Theory, in that strong identification towards the in-group creates a bias that leads to 
increased information sharing within that in-group (Ashforth et al., 2008).  My results support 
this hypothesis and show that, in general, employees are willing to share internal control 
weaknesses more with IAs than EAs.   
 Hypothesis 2 takes this a step further to state that the severity of the internal 
weaknesses will matter.  Specially, as severity of the weakness increases, the difference 
between the IA and EA will be magnified.  This is based on the silence literature, in which the 
decision to withhold relevant information increases with the intensity of threat that 
information provides (Kish-Gephart et al., 2009). Therefore, more severe information will 
cause employees to be silent. Again, identity creates a bias with the in-group over the out-
group, therefore silence will be invoked more often for the EA than IA.  Results again provide 
support for hypothesis 2 as I find the difference in information sharing between IAs and EAs 
is found specifically in the high severity IC weaknesses.  Also, I perform a basic mitigation 
analysis which provides some support for silence as the process in which the IA identity 
creates the difference in information sharing. 
 Practically, this demonstrates that it is very important for the EA to use the IA, or the 
IAs previous work, during the IC assessment process.  Due to the IA’s status within the 
organization (part of the organization), the IA has a comparative advantage over the EA to 
gain information from employees.  SOX 404 internal control assessment requires 
management and EAs to report on the internal controls of an organization (SOX, 2002). Both 
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management and EAs are expected to report on internal control weaknesses found at three 
levels; deficiencies (low severity), significant deficiencies (medium severity) and material 
weaknesses (high severity).  Considering the IA’s comparative advantage is specifically for 
high severity information (material weaknesses), it is particularly important for the EA to 
understand that the IA has an advantage in gathering high severity information. 
6.1.2 Study Two 
 Study two focuses on my second overall research question, which is; once the IA has 
obtained the internal control weaknesses can the IA readily move from one identity to the 
other (from the organizational insider to the professional auditor) and assess the internal 
control information objectively? I predict in hypothesis 3 that an IA with strong organizational 
identity will assess IC weaknesses less severely than an IA with weak organizational identity 
or an EA.  Again, I rely on social identity theory to make these predictions, as SIT predicts 
that individuals typically make more positive evaluations of their in-group than their out-
group (Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Hogg and Terry, 2000).  I find some support that IAs with a 
strong organizational identity rate the IC weaknesses less severely than both weak 
organizational identity IAs and EAs.  Considering there have been conflicting results in prior 
literature, the marginally significant result found is not too surprising.  Although I expected 
my results to be similar to field data found in a study by Bedard and Graham (2011), in which 
the IA typically classifies internal control deficiencies as less severe than they should be, my 
results are stronger than Stefaniak et al. (2012), in which they found no overall difference 
between IAs and EAs when making assessments.       
 In hypothesis 4a and 4b, I predict that salient professional standards will attenuate the 
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difference in severity rating between the IAs with a strong organizational identity and the IAs 
with a weak organization identity or the EAs.  This prediction is based again on social identity 
theory and the social norms literature.  As an individual becomes more aware of the norms of 
their professional group they will be more aware of what that professional group expects from 
them.  Considering I found small differences between the three auditor groups in hypotheses 
3a and 3b, I expect that making IA professional standards (professional norms) salient to the 
IA would cause the IA with a strong organizational identity to rate weaknesses more severely.  
I do find strong support for this hypothesis as salient professional norms do have an impact on 
strong organizational identity IAs in that they rate IC weaknesses more severely than weak 
organizational identity IAs and EAs, which means the professional norms may even make the 
strong organizational identity IAs overly conservative in their assessment. 
Hypothesis 5 switches the focus from how the IA reacts to salient professional 
standards (professional norms) to how the EA reacts to knowing the IA follows these 
professional standards.  Knowing that strong professional norms exist for the IA will help to 
ease any concerns the EAs has of the IA’s objectivity, which will allow the EA to be more 
willing to rely on the IA.  I find strong support for hypothesis 5 as knowing that the IA 
follows strong professional standards does make the EA more willing to rely on the IA.  
      Practically, these results again provide support that an IA with a strong organizational 
identity is a benefit to their own organization, to EAs and to the audit process as a whole.  
Critics of the IA having this strong organizational identity argue that the relationship the IA 
develops within the organization will affect their objectivity when asked to assess the 
organization’s internal controls.  My results show that this may be the case, but any bias found 
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can be attenuated.  Salient professional standards for an IA will help ensure the IA is objective 
and will actually cause the IA to be more conservative than EAs in their assessments.  Right 
now in practice IAs are only recommended to follow the IIA’s code of ethics.  To ensure IA 
objectivity, in fact and perception, IA functions (IAFs) could make the IIA code of ethics 
mandatory within their organization.  A stronger link with the IIA would make the IA 
professional standards more salient.  Also, by making the EA directly aware of a strong 
connection with the IIA and their code of ethics, IAs could improve their image of objectivity.  
This stronger connection with the IIA, based on the results of hypothesis 5, will also lead to 
EAs relying more on the IA and their work.  Organizations would benefit in that audit fees 
could be reduced due to minimizing of repeated processes by both the IA and EA.    
6.2 Limitations and Future Research Opportunities 
 Limitations in my thesis provide opportunities for future research.  Although the 
results in Study one were as expected, I believe a better understanding is necessary of the 
result that IAs would actually share more high severity information than low severity 
information.  My study specifically focused on the silence literature, but I believe a better 
understanding of the voice literature is also needed.  Future research could focus specifically 
on the voice literature to determine why employees would share more high severe information 
with IAs than low severe information.  Future research could also focus on how to improve 
the information sharing between employees and EAs.  Understanding how an EA can gain 
more information from employees could also help to improve the audit process as a whole.   
 In Study two, results of hypothesis 3a and 3b were not as strong as expected.  There 
are two possible explanations for this.  The first explanation is that the IA is fairly objective in 
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their assessments, as found in Stefaniak at el. (2012). The second explanation is that the 
strong organizational identity manipulation was not strong enough, as was also a concern 
within the Stefaniak et al. (2012) study.  My manipulation check of organizational identity 
was only found to be marginally significant between the strong organizational identity IA and 
the weak organizational identity IA.  To investigate this further, future research could focus 
on strengthening this manipulation.  Creating a significant difference of strong and weak 
organizational identity could help to improve our understanding if IAs do have an in-group 
bias when making assessments, as found in Bedard and Graham (2011); or if the bias does not 
exist, as found in my results and the Stefaniak et al. (2012) study.   
 Also in Study two, I test whether EAs will rely on IAs more when the EAs are made 
aware of the IAs’ professional standards.  I find support for this prediction, but there could be 
a concern that the manipulation of professional norms awareness is too strong.  By 
specifically telling the EA that “…the internal auditors at XYZ, Inc. are required to follow the 
code of ethics”, may make the EA believe the company XYZ, Inc. has taken extra care to 
guarantee the objectivity of the IA.  Therefore, future research could focus on re-examining 
this hypothesis while reducing the strength of the manipulation.  Also, the overall question of 
EA reliance on IAs is a complex topic and should be reviewed in much more depth.  My study 
provides a mechanism which can increase the EAs reliance on IAs, but future research could 
focus on understanding the pros and cons of relying more on the IA and the boundaries in 
which this reliance will and should occur.    
6.3 Conclusion 
 Overall, my thesis demonstrates that a strong organizational identity is a benefit to the 
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IA, as the IIA and their others believe.  The strong identity an IA has with their organization 
can help the IA obtain more information from employees than would be possible from an 
outsider, such as an EA or an outsourced IA.  The concern from critics, that IAs with a strong 
identity will be less objective, was only slightly substantiated within my thesis.  An IA with a 
strong organizational identity may have an in-group bias, but having a salient professional 
standard for the IA would not only ensure the any bias would not affect their objectivity, but 
would also cause the IA to be even more conservative in their assessments.  I also found in my 
thesis that EAs should be more willing to rely on the IA. This reliance could help to lower 
audit costs, by limiting duplicate work and improve the overall audit process.   Overall, a 
strong organization identity and salient professional standards for the IA will provide more 
pertinent information to the audit process, ensure IA objectivity and increase EA reliance on 
the IA, which can only improve the audit process as a whole.    
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Appendix A 
Study One Instrument 
 
Please note this is a summary of the actual instrument used. Subheadings in bold  italics 
are provided to guide the reader through the instrument and to allow the reader to make a 
connection between the material provided in this appendix and the main body of the 
dissertation.  
 
Prescreen: (used on Amazon MTurk to ensure proper participants) 
Are you either an internal or an external auditor? Yes No (must answer no) 
Do you work in an office setting? Yes No (must answer yes) 
Have you ever had an interaction with an auditor? Yes No (must answer yes) 
If yes, how many?  
Is your organization subject to SOX 404 requirements? Yes No  
 
Auditor Identity Manipulation: 
Introduction for all participants 
In the following scenario you will be asked to play the role of yourself within a hypothetical 
organization, in which you will interact with an internal (external) auditor. Before you start 
the hypothetical scenario, in a couple of sentences please briefly discuss your most recent 
actual interaction with an internal (external) auditor. 
 
Once you hit next you will not be able to go back to previous pages, so please pay attention to 
the background information. 
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High Auditor Identity Low Auditor Identity 
You are an employee within the accounting 
department of XYZ, Inc. and have been for 
some time.  XYZ, Inc. as an organization 
has been consistently profitable during your 
time there and the organization has had no 
major financial or public relation issues to 
speak of.  Overall, you are happy in your 
current position and you have no serious 
complaints about your manager or co-
workers.  Your organization is about to go 
through its annual internal control 
assessment.  
This assessment has occurred every year 
since you started working here and your 
involvement is fairly regular.  This 
particular assessment will be conducted by 
your organization’s internal audit 
department, not the external auditor.  
This internal control assessment is used to 
fulfill management’s SOX 404 
requirements. Although the IA is performing 
the internal control assessment, they report 
to the Audit committee, ensuring their 
independence.  Your organization’s internal 
audit department’s main function is to 
monitor and improve the internal controls of 
your organization.   
The internal audit department is structured 
similar to and is located in the same building 
as your own department, located 2 floors 
down.   The internal auditors within the 
department have a similar pay and benefit 
structure as yourself.  You have been in 
training sessions with many of the internal 
auditors, but do not know any of them 
personally.  Also, in the past the IA has been 
assessed by the external auditor as being 
competent and objective. 
You are an employee within the accounting 
department of XYZ, Inc. and have been for 
some time.  XYZ, Inc. as an organization has 
been consistently profitable during your time 
there and the organization has had no major 
financial or public relation issues to speak of.  
Overall, you are happy in your current 
position and you have no serious complaints 
of your manager or any co-workers.  Your 
organization is about to go through its annual 
internal control assessment.  
This assessment has occurred every year 
since you started working here and your 
involvement is fairly regular.  This particular 
assessment will be conducted by your 
organization’s external audit firm.  This 
internal control assessment is used to fulfill 
the external auditor’s SOX 404 
requirements. The external audit firm is one 
of the ‘big 4’ accounting firms and is a 
reputable organization (3rd party 
organizations typically hired by the audit 
committee to perform an overall audit of your 
organization’s financial statements). The 
external auditor’s main function is to assess 
the overall accuracy of the financial 
statements.  In doing so, they are typically 
required to express an opinion on the overall 
effectiveness of your organization’s internal 
controls, which will be included in their 
overall audit report.   
Employees from the external audit firm 
typically come in for a week or two a year, 
but their main office is located on the other 
side of town and they are paid directly by 
their own firm.  The external auditor reports 
directly to their 3rd party organization and is 
completely independent.  You typically don’t 
have much contact with the external auditor 
and each year it is a different external auditor 
that shows up to conduct the assessment.  
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Comprehension Check: 
Please answer the following questions about the previous information: 
Note: you will need to respond correctly to continue.  You will receive multiple attempts until 
you do answer correctly. 
 
High Auditor Identity Low Auditor Identity 
1) Who employs the internal auditor? 
a) My organization (correct) 
b) A 3rd party organization 
c) The government 
1) Who employs the external auditor? 
a) My organization 
b) A 3rd party organization (correct) 
c) The government 
 
Internal Control Assessment Explained:  
You have been informed, via email, that the internal auditor (external auditor) will be 
conducting this internal control assessment next week.  The internal auditor (external 
auditor) has randomly selected a number of employees to interview and you have been 
selected.  The internal auditor (external auditor) is looking for any internal control 
concerns that exist within your organization27.    
 
Provided on the next page is a list of internal control concerns you are aware that have 
occurred during the previous year.  Although the internal auditor (external auditor) doesn’t 
know you have this information, the internal auditor (external auditor) may find out about 
these concerns from other employees being interviewed.  The internal auditor (external 
auditor) is interested in all internal control concerns, regardless of severity or materiality.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
27 The word “Concerns” is used throughout the instrument in place of “Weaknesses” to avoid biasing the 
participants into assuming they should all be considered “Weaknesses”.  
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Provided List of 4 Known IC Weaknesses: 
High severity: 
IC1. Employees with password protected access to confidential client information stores 
their password on a sticky note underneath their keyboard.  Client information includes 
credit card numbers and Social Insurance numbers. 
IC2. Sales personnel frequently make unauthorized modifications to the terms of the 
company’s standard sales contracts and there is not a review process in place to approve 
these changes. The nature of the modifications can greatly affect the timing and amount of 
revenue recognized. Individual sales transactions are frequently significant to the entity, and 
the gross margin can vary significantly for each transaction. 
Low severity: 
IC5. Salespeople gave discounts to customers and failed to record them on the customer 
order. In most instances, minor adjustments to revenue were made without contacting these 
salespeople. 
IC6. The company has a written policy outlining when it is appropriate to provide meals to 
employees and requires a list of all attendees. Many times documentation supporting these 
meals and refreshment expenses at large company meetings does not generally show who 
attended these meetings or why attendees required food and refreshments to conduct 
business. 
 
Dependent Variable and Process Measure: 
 
Please answer the following questions for each internal control concern: 
1C1  (Example – same process was followed for all four internal control weaknesses) An 
employee with password protected access to confidential client information stores their 
password on a sticky note underneath their keyboard.  Client information includes credit card 
numbers and social insurance numbers. 
 
How comfortable would you be to share this information during the interview with the 
auditor? (1=Not very comfortable, 7=Very comfortable) 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Not Very                               Very 
Comfortable                     Comfortable 
 
Please state the reason behind your selected comfort level: 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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How likely is it that you would share this information during the interview? (1=NOT Likely I 
would share the information, 7=Likely I would share the information) 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Likely               Likely 
Not to share                                                      to share 
 
Please state the reason for level of willingness to share the weakness: 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Reason for Silence Question: 
 
On a scale of 1 to 7 please rate the likelihood of the following statements being the reason that 
you might hold back information (1=Least likely the reason I might hold back information, 
7=Most likely the reason I might hold back information.)   
 
A) I do not believe I can make a difference. 
B) I am fearful of the repercussions that could occur from providing this information 
C) I do not want to provide information that may hurt my organization. 
 
 
Measure Organizational Identification: (covariate) 
[1 = Strongly Agree; 7 = Strongly Disagree] 
(1)  When someone criticizes my organization, it feels like a personal insult. 
(2)  I am very interested in what others think about my organization. 
(3)  When I talk about my organization, I usually say "we” rather than “they” 
(4)  My organization’s successes are my successes. 
(5)  When someone praises my organization, it feels like a personal compliment. 
(6)  If a story in the media criticized my organization, I would feel embarrassed. 
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Organizational identity covariate: 
Select the picture below that best describes how your personal attributes, qualities, and values 
align or overlap with the attributes, qualities, and values of the internal (external) auditor.  
 
 
 
Demographic Questions: 
These questions are to help describe the study sample and are optional. You may leave blank. 
 
Age Range: 20-30 31-40 41-50 >50    
Sex:  M   F 
Years of work experience:  1-3 4-6 7-9 10+ 
Have you ever been involved in an internal control assessment: Y N 
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Appendix B 
Study Two Instrument 
Please note this is a summary of the actual instrument used. Subheadings in bold italics are 
provided to guide the reader through the instrument and to allow the reader to make a 
connection between the material provided in this appendix and the main body of the 
dissertation.  
Professional Norm Salience Manipulation:  
Salient Professional Norm Condition 
External Auditor Information: Internal Auditor Information: 
Below is a summary version of the Institute of 
Internal Auditors code of ethics principles, 
which the internal auditors at XYZ, Inc. are 
required to follow.  (XYZ, Inc. is your 
hypothetical client throughout the following 
scenario).  Please carefully review this 
document and answer the questions related to it 
on the following page. 
 
Below is a summary version of the Institute 
of Internal Auditors code of ethics 
principles.  Please carefully review this 
document and answer the questions related 
to it on the following page. 
 
CODE OF ETHICS 
Principles 
Internal auditors are expected to apply and uphold the following principles: 
1. Integrity 
The integrity of internal auditors establishes trust and thus provides the basis for reliance 
on their judgment. 
2. Objectivity 
Internal auditors exhibit the highest level of professional objectivity in gathering, 
evaluating, and communicating information about the activity or process being examined. 
Internal auditors make a balanced assessment of all the relevant circumstances and are not 
unduly influenced by their own interests or by others in forming judgments 
3. Confidentiality 
Internal auditors respect the value and ownership of information they receive and do not 
disclose information without appropriate authority unless there is a legal or professional 
obligation to do so. 
4. Competency 
Internal auditors apply the knowledge, skills, and experience needed in the performance of 
internal audit services. 
*These principles are recommended for all Internal Auditors and required for all IIA 
members. 
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Related Questions: 
 
Are these code of ethics principles mandatory for all internal auditors? Yes No 
Is the document easy to read? Yes No 
Is the document easy to understand? Yes No 
(Following only for internal auditor salient Professional Norm condition) 
Are these principles similar to your own code of ethics principles? Yes No 
Please list any major differences. 
Do you adhere to similar principles? Yes No 
(Following only for external auditor salient Professional Norm condition) 
Are these code of ethics principles required to be followed by XYZ, Inc. internal auditors? 
Yes No 
 
Non-Salient Professional Norm Condition 
 
(EAs and IAs receive the same information) 
Below is an article discussing the decrease in PC’s sales as tablets rise in popularity.  Please 
carefully read this article and answer the questions related to it: 
 
News Article 
Here we go again. The San Jose Mercury News is reporting that IDC (Intl. Data Corp) 
predicts 2013 will bring more bad news for the PC. The de facto barometer of 
consumer markets has revised its latest estimate for yearly PC sales downward. What 
was expected to be a 1.3% decline has now been projected to be more like 7.8%.  
The blame is placed squarely on an increase in tablet sales. With 229.3 million 
expected this year IDC has gone so far as to predict tablet sales to outpace the entirety 
of the PC market by 2015.  
Unfortunately, the news is both obvious and misplaced.  
Comparing sales of the Galaxy Note to a laptop is akin to comparing a fine wine to a 
44 ounce fountain drink.  
Tablets are consumer devices more on par with their Smartphone cousins than any 
laptop. In a market sense they are disposable. Conversely, laptops and the PC market 
in general operate on a much longer replacement cycle. It's not uncommon, for 
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example, for the average tech savvy consumer to purchase 2 tablets during the lifespan 
of one laptop.  
These days nobody would seriously consider paying upwards of $1000 for a laptop 
just to browse the web and check their email when a $300 tablet will do. It's a given 
that such mundane mobility tasks have been ceded to the smart device market.  
As such, the decline of PC market share is to be expected but isn't quite the death knell 
the tech punditry keeps drumming on about. Rather it's a realignment of markets 
defined by their functionality instead of their volume and that's as it should be.  
A Surface Pro is not a competitor to any iPad even though both claim a tablet form 
factor. Their purposes are distinct and so are their customers.  
In a sense, the cheap, underpowered laptop of yesterday is the progenitor of the today's 
tablet which now occupies it's place in the market. A classic case of technological 
evolution and natural selection if ever there was one.  
Related Questions: 
 
Is this article easy to read? Yes No 
Is the article easy to understand? Yes No 
Is this article related to your line of work? Yes No 
 
Internal Auditor Scenario Introduction: 
Prime Organizational Identity 
  
In the following scenario you will be asked to play the role of yourself, an internal auditor 
within your particular organization.  You will be presented with a hypothetical situation and 
some of the details may not exactly match to how your organization operates, but this is to 
ensure consistency across all participants.  Please provide us with the following information 
about your organization: 
 
1) Please list 3 qualities of your organization that make it a worthwhile employer.   
 1. 
 2. 
 3. 
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Measure Organizational Identification: (co-variate) 
[1 = Strongly Agree; 7 = Strongly Disagree] 
(1)  When someone criticizes my organization, it feels like a personal insult. 
(2)  I am very interested in what others think about my organization. 
(3)  When I talk about my organization, I usually say "we” rather than “they” 
(4)  My organization’s successes are my successes. 
(5)  When someone praises my organization, it feels like a personal compliment. 
(6)  If a story in the media criticized my organization, I would feel embarrassed. 
 
External Auditor Scenario Introduction: 
In the following scenario you will be asked to play the role of yourself, an external auditor. 
You will be presented with a hypothetical situation in which you will be part of an internal 
control assessment at one of your clients, XYZ, Inc. Some of the details may not exactly 
match to how your firm operates, but this is to ensure consistency across all participants.   
 The XYZ, Inc. has an internal audit function.  This internal audit function has just 
finished completed their own internal control assessment.  This assessment was prepared on 
management’s behalf as per SOX 404 requirements.  Your firm has assessed the internal audit 
function of XYZ, Inc. as being competent.  Your firm agreed to use the assistance of XYZ's 
internal auditors in past and it has been assessed as high quality.  The audit committee of 
XYZ has recently placed pressure on your firm to reduce audit fees so your internal control 
assessment will need to be performed efficiently. 
 
Organizational Identity Manipulation: 
High organizational identity Low organizational identity External auditor 
Your organization is 
conducting an overall 
internal control assessment. 
This assessment will be used 
to fulfill management’s SOX 
404 requirements. You have 
recently conducted many 
interviews with employees of 
your organization and have 
obtained a list of 4 internal 
control concerns within your 
organization.  On the 
following page is the list of 
the 4 concerns that were 
shared with you. 
 
Your organization has recently 
purchased another firm, XYZ Inc.  
This firm will continue to operate on 
its own, but at this time they do not 
have an internal audit department.  
Management has decided to outsource 
your internal audit department to XYZ 
Inc. until such time as they create their 
own internal audit department.  You 
have been asked to help assess the 
overall internal controls of this other 
organization.  You have conducted 
many interviews with the XYZ Inc.’s 
employees and have obtained a list of 
4 internal control concerns within 
XYZ, Inc.  On the following page is 
the list of the 4 concerns that were 
shared with you. 
To start the internal 
control assessment 
process you have 
conducted many 
interviews with the 
XYZ Inc.’s employees 
and have obtained a 
list of 4 internal 
control concerns that 
have occurred at XYZ, 
Inc.  On the following 
page is the list of the 4 
concerns that were 
shared with you. 
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List of 4 Known IC Weaknesses: 
 
High severity: 
IC1. Employees with password protected access to confidential client information stores 
their password on a sticky note underneath their keyboard.  Client information includes 
credit card numbers and Social Insurance numbers. 
IC2. Sales personnel frequently make unauthorized modifications to the terms of the 
company’s standard sales contracts and there is not a review process in place to approve 
these changes. The nature of the modifications can greatly affect the timing and amount of 
revenue recognized. Individual sales transactions are frequently significant to the entity, 
and the gross margin can vary significantly for each transaction. 
Low severity: 
IC5. Salespeople gave discounts to customers and failed to record them on the customer 
order. In most instances, minor adjustments to revenue were made without contacting these 
salespeople. 
IC6. The company has a written policy outlining when it is appropriate to provide meals to 
employees and requires a list of all attendees. Many times documentation supporting these 
meals and refreshment expenses at large company meetings does not generally show who 
attended these meetings or why attendees required food and refreshments to conduct 
business. 
 
Comprehension Check Question:  
 
Please answer the following question about the previous information read: 
Note: you will need to respond correctly to continue.  You will receive multiple attempts until 
you do answer correctly. 
 
What organization are you conducting an internal control assessment for? 
a) Your own organization 
b) XYZ, Inc. 
c) A competitor 
d) The government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                            120 
Dependent Variables: 
Please answer the following questions for each internal control concern: 
 
Please select whether you believe it this internal control concern to be a material weakness, 
significant deficiency or neither. 
Material Weakness 
Significant Deficiency 
Neither 
 
Please rate this internal control concern based on your opinion of its overall level of severity     
(1 being low severity to 7 being high severity).  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Low      Medium    High 
Severity     Severity             Severity 
 
(External auditors only) 
Please indicate how useful it would have been to have the organization’s internal control 
assessment (conducted by the internal auditor) when conducting your own assessment (1 
being not very useful to 7 being very useful).  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Not            Very 
Useful           Useful 
  
Please indicate your willingness to rely on the organization’s internal control assessment 
(conducted by the internal auditor) based on information provided about the internal audit 
function. (1 not willing to 7 very willing).  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Not       Somewhat    Very 
Willing     Willing                Willing
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Please rate your level of reliance on the organization’s internal control assessment (conducted 
by the internal auditor). (1 would not even read the assessment to 7 would rely fully on the 
assessment) 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Would not   Would read,               Would read  
even read  but not rely on                               and fully rely
                        
 
Please indicate why/why not you would be willing to rely on the organization’s internal 
control assessment (conducted by the internal auditor)? 
 
Manipulation Check Questions: 
Organizational Identity manipulation 
(High Organizational Identity Internal Auditors Only) 
 
1) Select the picture below that best describes how your personal attributes, qualities, and 
values align or overlap with the attributes, qualities, and values of your organization.  
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(Low Organizational Identity Internal Auditors Only) 
1) Select the picture below that best describes how your personal attributes, qualities, and 
values align or overlap with the attributes, qualities, and values of XYZ, Inc.  
 
 
 
 
 
Professional Norm Salience Manipulation  
(Internal auditors only) 
 
2) To what extent has the information in this experiment made you think about the accounting 
profession and the values, attributes, and qualities you possess as a member of this 
profession? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Gave it little           Neutral              Gave it much 
thought                  thought 
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(External auditors only) 
2) Based on the information in this experiment, please rate how objective you perceive the 
internal auditor to be. (1 being not very objective to 7 being highly objective).  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Not very           Neutral              Highly 
objective              objective
  
Control Questions: 
(External auditors only) 
Please rate the degree to which your organization typically relies on your client’s internal 
audit work. (1 typically does not rely on work to 7 typically relies on the work heavily). 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Does not         Somewhat                           Heavily 
Rely          Rely                    Rely
  
 
 
Please rate the degree to which you personally typically rely on your client’s internal audit 
work. (1 typically does not rely on work to 7 typically relies on the work heavily). 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Do not                     Somewhat                           Heavily 
Rely          Rely              Rely
  
 
In the past, how objective do you typically perceive internal auditor functions to be. (1 being 
not very objective to 7 being highly objective).  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Not very           Neutral            Highly 
objective             objective
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Demographic Questions: 
 
These questions are to help describe the study sample and are optional. You may leave blank. 
Age Range: 20-30 31-40 41-50 >50    
Sex:  M   F 
Years of audit experience:  1-3 4-6 7-9 10+ 
Years of Internal audit experience:  1-3 4-6 7-9 10+ 
Select highest level of education:   Undergrad Grad PhD 
Select any certifications: CPA CGA CMA CIA CA 
Have you ever been involved in an internal control assessment: Y N 
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Appendix C: 
11 Original Internal Control Weaknesses Used in Pilot Testing 
 
1. An employee with password protected access to confidential client information stores their 
password on a sticky note underneath their keyboard.  Client information includes credit card 
numbers and Social Insurance numbers. 
 
2. A lack of segregation of duties over the company’s shipping and receiving and the 
inventory record-keeping functions have been noted. This resulted in underreporting of 
inventory levels and an understatement of company-wide net income by 3.8%. The 
misstatement was detected by management and corrected prior to issuing external financial 
reports. 
 
3. New customers who do not meet the client’s minimum credit standard have been granted 
credit in the past. Also, new customers were added without proper credit approvals. 
 
4. Near the end of the year, the electronic approval by the credit manager was missing for 
several customer orders that exceeded the credit limit. These orders were still processed 
without the proper approval. 
 
5. Salespeople gave discounts to customers and failed to record them on the customer order. 
In most instances, once the adjustments to revenue were made salespeople were not contacted 
about this issue. 
 
6. A salesperson’s laptop was stolen. It contained a stored password that allowed a sales order 
to be downloaded to the system. Several bogus orders had been placed before the password 
was disabled. 
 
7. Detailed reconciliations of intercompany accounts are not performed on a timely basis, and 
differences in intercompany accounts are frequent and significant. Management does not 
perform any alternative controls to investigate significant intercompany account differences. 
 
8. Sales personnel frequently modify the terms of the company’s standard sales contracts and 
there is not a review process in place to approve these changes. The nature of the 
modifications can affect the timing and amount of revenue recognized. Individual sales 
transactions are frequently significant to the entity, and the gross margin can vary 
significantly for each transaction. 
 
9. There seems to be a level of undue bias or lack of objectivity by those responsible for 
accounting estimates.  For example, consistent understatement of expenses or overstatement 
of allowances at the direction of management has occurred. 
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10. Due to high turnover, the person responsible for the accounting and reporting function 
lacks the skills and knowledge to apply generally accepted accounting principles in recording 
the entity’s financial transactions and preparing its financial statements. 
 
11. The company has a written policy outlining when it is appropriate to provide meals to 
employees and requires a list of all attendees. Many times documentation supporting these 
meals and refreshment expenses at large company meetings does not generally show who 
attended these meetings or why attendees required food and refreshments to conduct business.  
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